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The exportation of encryption products must be controlled
to... promote our national security, including the protection of
the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.'
-President William J. Clinton
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the
rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my
opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore
always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free
speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency
justifying it.2
-Justice Louis Brandeis
Encryption Items Transferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce
Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572, 68,573 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 730,
732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 768, 772, 774) (announcing a plan to shift
encryption export regulation control to the Department of Commerce).
2 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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I. Just Imagine
Although math is not traditionally a lawyer's fortd, imagine
discovering a new mathematical formula that, when applied
correctly, would save thousands of lives and dollars across the
world. Then imagine that the formula is so complex that the only
hope of applying it correctly depends on computers doing the
calculations. Therefore, to communicate your discovery to the
world you create an electronic instruction manual written in
computer language. Those skilled in computer languages may
read the instruction manual to learn how your formula works. But,
more importantly, the large majority of people in the world who
are not as skilled may ask their computer to read it for them. In so
doing, are those people reading an expression from you as the
inventor and instruction manual creator? Is that an expression that
deserves limited protection under Constitutional freedom of
expression doctrines? What if users of the formula find a way to
use it for bad purposes-is the original instruction manual any less
of an expression?
The imaginary scenario and questions outlined above are
currently being considered in federal courts,3 on the Congressional
floor,4 and behind closed government doors.' The mathematical
formula is one that allows people to scramble their computer files
and their electronic communications in a way that is extremely
difficult to unscramble.6 This capability, termed "cryptography,"7
I See infra notes 129-272 and accompanying text.
4 See generally, 143 CONG. REC. E2276 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Dreier supporting recent export regulations limiting encryption export); 143 CONG.
REC. S10879 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Lott congratulating the House
on recent progress toward encryption export reforms).
I See Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software:
Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten U.S. Software Industry's Ability to
Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 479 & n.130 (1994)
(describing a phone interview with the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
whereby the author was told the evaluation process for "encryption software is classified
and not available to the public").
6 See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
I Cryptography, to most people, is concerned with keeping communications
private. R.S.A. LABORATORIES, ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
TODAY'S CRYPTOGRAPHY, VERSION 3.0, at 12 (1996) [hereinafter CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ].
As uses for cryptographic algorithms have multiplied, however, the definition has been
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is extremely valuable for corporations and individuals, but is also
threatening to U.S. security agencies.8  To understand these
competing interests, it is important to recognize today's
marketplace boundaries and how technology threatens security.
This Comment examines both the benefits and the concerns with
cryptography. It also considers how efforts to limit international
export are focused on a means of expression, namely software,
which is arguably equivalent to speech under the Constitution.
The Comment begins by detailing the evolution to this point in
the encryption debate and provides a recent example highlighting
inconsistencies in the present export scheme.9  Part II of the
Comment provides a foundation by defining the technology and
terms involved, and by presenting the current regulations and
process for encryption exporters. 0 Part III discusses the three
cases that have reached the federal courts with regard to exporting
cryptographic code." The arguments from those cases are
analyzed in Part IV which discusses the constitutional issues
involved. The most significant question presented by the cases is
whether software is speech within the free expression protections
that come with such a classification." Part V focuses on the policy
issues surrounding the encryption export dispute and how those
issues shape regulations around the world. 4  Finally, Part VI
discusses recent legislative proposals, along with guidance the
Constitution and the courts have provided for refining those
solutions. That Part concludes by noting that such lessons not
only impact contemporary export regulations, but also aid free
blurred. See id. At its base, "[cryptography today might be summed up as the study of
techniques and applications that depend on the existence of difficult problems. A
cryptanalyst attempts to compromise cryptographic mechanisms, and cryptology (from
the Greek krypt6s 16gos, meaning 'hidden word') is the discipline of cryptography and
cryptanalysis combined." Id.
8 See infra notes 390-422 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 55-128 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-272 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 273-388 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 281-95 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 389-468 and accompanying text.
"5 See infra notes 469-85 and accompanying text.
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expression interpretation as we move further into the information
16
age.
A. Internet Growing Pains
Ever since Vice President Albert Gore coined the term
"Information Superhighway,"' 7 the U.S. government has actively
marketed the Internet'8 and its benefits with gusto. 9 President
William J. Clinton has stated that "[t]he Internet should be a global
free-trade zone."2 ° The executive branch commissioned a report,
"A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce," 21 which aimed
to create a uniform code for electronic commerce and to delegate
many regulation issues to industry and consumer groups.22 As a
result of these efforts and the Internet's inherent attractions,
businesses and consumers have flocked to the Internet.23 In fact,
16 See infra notes 468-81 and accompanying text.
17 See 135 CONG. REc. S.1067, 9887 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Albert Gore extolling the virtues of investing in high-speed networks to the nation).
"8 The Internet, while "surfed" by many to uncover interesting topics, is rather
hidden to the casual user. Beneath its cohesive, marketed exterior, the Internet is "a
conglomerate of hundreds of thousands of networks owned by government agencies,
defense departments, universities, and corporations. Users can digitally discuss just
about any specialized area of concern with other users, often with the leaders in their
respective fields." Timothy B. Lennon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's
Prohibitions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REv. 467,
470 n.I I (1994).
'9 See Laura M. Pilkington, First and Fifth Amendment Challenges to Export
Controls on Encryption: Bernstein and Karn, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 159, 159 n.1
and accompanying text (1996) (noting that "[t]he federal government encourages the
expansion of the Internet and hails it as a revolution in the dissemination of information
and as an avenue for commerce").
20 Ted Lewis, We Don't Need No Regulation, SCL AM., Nov. 1997, at I (quoting
President Clinton "in reversing his administration's stance on the export of encrypted
computer products"). Although such remarks were hailed as an administration about-
face and as an embrace of encryption, subsequent regulatory moves proved otherwise.
See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
21 William J. Clinton, Text of the President's Message to Internet Users (visited
Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/message.html>
(announcing the release of a report outlining the administration's vision for the
emerging electronic marketplace).
22 See Lewis, supra note 20, at I (describing the report's general hands-off
recommendation for many privacy, security, and commerce issues on the Internet).
23 Internet size has doubled yearly since 1991. See Internet Facts (visited Nov. 20,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
electronic communications have become the prominent means of
communication for some circles. 4
There are literally trillions of bits of information floating on
the Internet involving various topics. This "digital information"
includes law journal articles, financial records, medical records,
electronic mail (email) messages, voice, video, and even
pornographic pictures. 25 All of this digital information could be of
interest to parties other than the transmitter and intended receiver.
For example, oppressive governments may be interested in the
26
email or voice communications of their citizens. Less oppressive
governments may also be interested in their citizens'
communications if they suspect the content is illegal.27  The most
prevalent danger, however, is from hackers28 who may see
lucrative embezzlement or blackmail opportunities in financial and
medical records.29 In fact, hackers pose a significant national
1998) <www.monseyny.com/facts>. The most recent estimate of Internet size is 150
million users worldwide, with 87 million of those from the United States and Canada.
See NUA Internet Surveys, How Many Online? (visited Nov. 20, 1998)
<http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-many-online/index.html>.
24 See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16, Junger v. Daley, 8 F.
Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (No. 96 CV 1723) (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http://www.jya.com/pdj4.htm> (describing the dire consequences of encryption
regulation as viewed by the Association for Computing Machinery).
25 See Lennon, supra note 18, at 470 (underscoring that the breadth of "digital
information" is limited only by the imagination).
26 See AdvoNet, PGP is Pretty Good Privacy (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http://calebproject.org/pgp.htm> (warning encryption users in China and Iraq that their
governments may be suspicious of the technology, as opposed to Singapore and Taiwan
where encrypted messages are commonplace).
27 See Lennon, supra note 18, at 495 n.198. Michael J. Steen was convicted of
trafficking in child pornography via computer. See id. The police were particularly
upset that co-conspirators were never apprehended, in part because Steen used a system
of communicating only in encrypted messages. See id.
28 "Hackers are people known for breaking into computer systems . Evans,
supra note 5, at 470. They often cause mischief and even damage to information on
those systems. See id. Such access to computer systems "generally occurs for one of
three reasons: (1) an illegal attack for profit or some other benefit; (2) a malicious attack
for revenge; or (3) a partially or totally nondestructive attack perpetrated as a game or
challenge." Id. What was once considered by many to be a childish prank is now a
serious concern to corporations, governments, and law enforcement agencies. See id.
29 See generally id. at 470-72 (describing hackers, viruses, and "technical
mercenaries").
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security risk as the global battlefronts fundamentally change to
economic rather than military.3°
B. The Two Faces of Protection
Presented with financial and privacy risks, businesses have
turned to programs which scramble their digital information.3 The
cryptography technology employed generally involves encryption,
which scrambles data, and decryption, which unscrambles it. 2
Those companies that have not employed cryptography have either
sacrificed security or foregone the Internet's advantages.33 Beyond
business rationales, individuals are growing more concerned with
34the vulnerability of their digital information. As such, many are
turning to encryption to help them keep information on their
computer as secure as their real-world valuables.35 Regardless of
the identity of the user, encryption is considered the "cornerstone
of personal privacy and on-line security. 36
30 See Online Security Issues: Hearing of the Science, Tech. and Space Subcomm.
of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transp. Comm., 104th Cong. 15 (1996)
[hereinafter Security Hearings] (testimony of Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems
Engineer, warning that "we're in more danger of going broke than of getting overrun").
Diffie's hearing testimony further iterated that "it is very important that we do not
squander ... [our] advantage [in computer and communication products and services]
by continuing Cold War regulations." Id.
31 See Evans, supra note 5, at 481 (quoting Eric Hirschhorn & David Peyton,
Uncle Sam's Secret Decoder Ring, WASH. POST, June 25, 1992, at A23, which claims
that encryption has become a "routine business precaution").
32 See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text (describing cryptography and its
uses).
33 See generally Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and
Trusted Third-Party Encryption (visited Nov. 10, 1997) <http://www.crypto.com/key
_study/report.shtml> (discussing the consequences of encryption regulations on Internet
and economy growth). This report, completed May 27, 1997, was the output of 11 of
the world's foremost cryptography experts. See id. They concluded that
uncompromised, secure networks are a necessity for the Internet and its users to reach
their true potential. See id.
31 In fact, companies have been formed solely to help individuals maintain privacy
while using the Internet. TRUSTe is one such company that helps users avoid exposure
of their information. See generally TRUSTe, Building a Web you can believe in (visited
Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.truste.org>.
" See Evans, supra note 5, at 481 n.143 (citing Weekend Edition (National Public
Radio broadcast, Jan. 3, 1993)).
36 Security Hearings, supra note 30, at 30 (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Director,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
The U.S. government recognizes these beneficial encryption
applications but has concerns about its deleterious uses.37 In
particular, the National Security Agency (NSA),38 commissioned
by President Truman as an arsenal of communication
interception,39 has fought against availability of cryptographic
technology.40 NSA's concern, along with that of other police
agencies, is that efforts to stop terrorists and child pornographers1
will be thwarted by strong encryption.4 ' This concern has led to an
NSA campaign influencing regulatory and legislative decisions to
limit encryption domestically and abroad. 43  Although domestic
encryption is currently legal, NSA's influence has affected export
controls.44 Providers of encryption must adhere to guidelines that
require a license for exporting certain encryption formulas and
strengths. 45 Encryption and privacy advocates claim such controls
are irrational and unconstitutional restraints on speech.46  Before
Electronic Privacy Information Center, noting that the need for information security is
clear to most online users). Rotenberg went further to note that online security interest
grew during initial government attempts to impose a proprietary encryption solution
called the Clipper Chip. See id. This chip allowed the government a "backdoor" to all
communications which used the Clipper Chip for encryption. See id. A grass-roots
uprising took hold to defeat that proposal, with 47,000 signatures on electronic petitions
opposing the Clipper. See id.
17 See Lennon, supra note 18, at 472 (noting that the struggle to control encryption
is at the heart of tension between the desire to safeguard private information and the
desire to preserve law-enforcement capabilities).
38 See Evans, supra note 5, at 478 (describing the establishment of the National
Security Agency in 1947 and the agency's primary intelligence and communications
responsibilities).
3 See id.
40 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 156 (describing the influence NSA
exerts over commercial cryptography).
4' See Lennon, supra note 18, at 495 n.198 (describing dissatisfied police who
caught a California on-line child pornographer but never apprehended his co-
conspirators because communications were encrypted).
42 See infra notes 394-405 and accompanying text (discussing the key government
concern: national security).
43 See infra notes 394-405 and accompanying text (discussing the key government
concern: national security).
4 See Evans, supra note 5, at 478-79 (describing past and present NSA positions
on exporting encryption).
45 See infra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
46 See Security Hearings, supra note 30, passim.
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analyzing the legal and policy arguments of this debate, it is
informative to look at one encryption provider's recent export
experience.
C. Pretty Good Publishing
Phil Zimmerman, a Colorado computer programmer, created a
product called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)47 which enabled users to
encrypt and decrypt their email.48 Because of strong beliefs about
an individual's right to privacy, and possibly to create a de facto
standard, he created free versions of his programs for anyone to
use.49  After various difficulties with the authorities in exporting
his early versions, Zimmerman decided to publish his most recent
version, PGP 5.0, in twelve volumes of print form.50 Although he
claims the volumes were printed to allow peer review of his
algorithms, the printing also allowed for access to a loophole in
the export restrictions.5 Because his algorithms were so difficult
to break, export regulations did not allow export of his code by
disk or the Internet." However, in recognition of free expression
principles, the regulations permitted exporting the same code in
41 PGP is now one of the most widely used products for secure communications.
See Thinh Nguyen, Note, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in
Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 679 n.91
(1997).
48 See id.
41 See generally Philip R. Zimmerman, Foreword to the First Volume of PRETrY
GOOD PRIVACY 5.0 PLATFORM INDEPENDENT SOURCE CODE (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://mail.telstar.net/mirror/pgp/foreword.shtml> (describing Zimmerman's recent
legal battles and the new features of PGP 5.0). His free-download approach distributed
PGP across the globe. See Lennon, supra note 18, at 495 n.195. For example, it was the
eighth most popular piece of software downloaded from a large New York-based
software site. See id.
10 See Philip R. Zimmerman, Foreword to the First Volume of PRETTY GOOD
PRIVACY 5.0 PLATFORM INDEPENDENT SOURCE CODE (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://mail.telstar.net/mirror/pgp/foreword.shtml> (describing Zimmerman's recent
legal battles and the new features of PGP 5.0).
51 See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory
exception made for printed material even where the same material in electronic form is
restricted).
52 See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (noting that publishing
encryption programs on a web page requires an export license).
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printed form. 3 Thus, within weeks of Zimmerman's releasing
PGP 5.0 in the United States, a group in Norway legally received
the printed books and scanned in the code to create PGP 5.0i, the
international edition.54 For some this was a triumph for privacy,
for others a defeat for national security. Either way, it highlights
the disputed distinctions that exist in the current encryption export
regulations.
II. Encryption and Export: A Foundation
To understand the issues being raised in judicial and legislative
proceedings about encryption, it is imperative to investigate the
history and terms of the science of cryptography. Furthermore, to
advise an encryption exporter, one must be familiar with the
technology distinctions in the regulations and the process required
to obtain a license.
A. A Cryptography Primer
1. Cryptography and Its Uses
The term "cryptography" stems from ancient Greek roots
signifying "hidden writing;"55 generally, cryptography means
writing in a secret manner.56 The benefits of cryptography have
been recognized for centuries.57 For example, the Greeks and
Romans disguised messages58 as did our founding fathers, Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison.59 Encryption is the process of
5 See id.
5 See PGP 5.0 exported! (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://www.pgpi.com/project/
pgp50.shtml> (describing the scanning process and the international anticipation of PGP
5.Oi as "encryption for the masses").
55 SHAWN JAMES ROSENHEIM, THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC IMAGINATION 19 (1997).
56 See generally id.
51 See id.
58 See Evans, supra note 5, at 472 n.31 (noting that early Greeks and Julius Caesar
used encryption techniques to protect confidential messages (citing PER
CHRISTOFFERSSON ET AL., CRYPTO USERS' HANDBOOK 88 (1988))).
59 See Rachel E. Schwartz, US Courts Split on Restricting Encryption Software,
LAW JOURNAL EXTRA!, July/Aug. 1997, at I (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://www.ipww.com/jul97/p31us.html> (noting that Bill of Rights author James
Madison used a cipher devised by Thomas Jefferson for communication while in
[Vol. 24
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transforming a message, called plaintext, into some unreadable
form, known as ciphertext. 6°  This is done by applying a
cryptographic algorithm to the text.6' Decryption is the process of
reversing the transformation in a manner to reveal the original
62plaintext message.
The National Research Council (NRC) has identified four
major uses of cryptography: "ensuring data integrity,
authenticating users, facilitating nonrepudiation (the linking of a
specific message to a specific sender) and maintaining
confidentiality., 63 The attractions of confidentiality and protecting
assets are widely known, but additional benefits of encryption
stem from its data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation
features for digital signatures.6M The lack of secure authentication
has hindered the effort for computers to replace paper, and some
feel that digital signatures are the exact tool necessary to move the
most essential paper-based documents to digital electronic media.65
The methods, like the benefits, of performing cryptography
vary. Although early cryptography depended on the secrecy of the
66
algorithm for its protection, more powerful, recent versions allow
the algorithm to be known and, indeed, encourage attack.67 This is
possible because the secret is found in the user's key and not in the
algorithm.66  The key and the plaintext are supplied to a non-
France).
60 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (1994).
61 See id. at 2.
62 See id. at 1.
63 Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State (Bernstein III), 974 F. Supp. 1288,
1292 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
64 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 1 1-1 2.
65 See id. at 33 (describing digital signature uses for items such as leases, wills,
passports, transcripts, checks, and voter registration).
66 These algorithms are called "restricted" and are considered "woefully
inadequate" for today's security needs. See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 2.
67 Cf. CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 37. The Digital Signature Algorithm
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) received
criticism for its secretive and arbitrary process that allowed little scrutiny of the
algorithm involved. See id.
68 See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 2-4 (describing the role keys play in modem
encryption systems).
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restricted algorithm to produce the ciphertext.69 The two most
widely used systems are secret-key and public-key. 0
2. Secret-Key Algorithms
Secret-key algorithms exist when "the encryption key can be
calculated from the decryption key and vice versa. '' 7' However,
such calculation is unnecessary if the encryption and decryption
keys are identical. The process for using a secret-key algorithm
involves: (1) agreeing on a secret key with the intended receiver
or sending her the key; (2) supplying plaintext and the key to an
algorithm to create the ciphertext; (3) sending the ciphertext to the
receiver; and (4) having the receiver supply the ciphertext and the
key to an algorithm to create the plaintext.72 The main obstacle
with a secret-key approach is reaching a consensus on the secret
key without anyone, except the sender and receiver, finding out.
7 3
When the sender and the receiver are in different locations, they
may be forced to rely on couriers, phone systems, or other forms
of communication to exchange the key.74 To minimize the effect
of a compromised key, some systems create a new random key for
every exchange.75
The most widely used cryptosystem in the world is the Data
Encryption Standard -(DES).76  The system utilizes a secret-key
algorithm created by the IBM Corporation,77 which was adopted as
69 See id. at 3 (diagramming the process of encryption and decryption with key in
Figure 1.2).
70 See id. at 3-4.
7' Id. at 3.
712 See generally CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 17 (describing problems
with secret key approaches).
73 See id.
74 See id.
71 See id. at 93. A One Time Pad (OTP) algorithm is an example of this. See
Michael Paul Johnson, Data Encryption Software and Technical Data Controls in the
United States of America § 4.8 (last modified Jan. 7, 1994)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITARexport/cryptusa.paper> (providing a short
sample implementation of a OTP encryption algorithm).
76 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 66. Alternatives to this standard are
the RC5, SAFER, and Skipjack algorithms. See id. at 76, 78, 80.
77 See id. at 66.
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a federal standard on November 23, 1976 and subsequently has
been re-certified every five years.78 The key used for the endorsed
standard has a length of fifty-six bits.79 Since brute-force attacks °
depend on trying various key combinations, an increased key
length yields greater protection from attack.8' Although a 56-bit
key length appeared virtually impossible to break in 1994, it is
now believed that a computer designed to crack DES can do so in
just three and a half hours.
3. Public-Key Algorithms
Public-key algorithms attempt to solve the secret-key
management problem by providing each person a pair of keys: a
public key and a private key.83 A receiver's public key, which is
used for encryption, can be published for all to see, whereas the
private key, which is used for decryption, must be heavily
guarded.84 Because the private key is not needed by both parties, it
never needs to be transmitted between the parties as do secret-
keys.85 The process for such an algorithm involves: (1) obtaining
a receiver's public key; (2) supplying plaintext and the public key
to an algorithm to create the ciphertext; (3) sending the ciphertext
to the receiver; and (4) having the receiver supply the ciphertext
and her private key to an algorithm to re-create the plaintext.86
78 See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 221-24. It has been suggested that 1993 was
the final renewal that standard will receive. See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at
66.
'9 See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 236 (noting that original designs called for a
128-bit key but the NSA felt 56-bit keys were sufficiently secure).
80 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 61 (describing "brute-force" or
exhaustive key search attacks).
81 See id.
82 See Evans, supra note 5, at 473 n.45 (describing the $1 million computer
required and noting that a $1 billion computer could succeed with a brute-force attack in
just 13 seconds (citing Bruce Schneier, The Cambridge Algorithms Workshop, DR.
DOBB'S J., Apr. 1994, at 22 (1994))); see also Johnson, supra note 75, at § 4.7 (claiming
that "DES was doomed to a limited lifetime from the beginning by limiting its key
length to 56 bits.").
83 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 17.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See generally SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 4 (describing the benefits of
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This approach provides security and convenience, and has the
added benefit of enabling digital signatures.87 However, the main
disadvantage of this method is the slow speed.8" To solve the
speed problem many solutions use fast secret-key methods to
encrypt full messages and use public-key methods to encrypt
exchange of the secret key.89
The most popular public-key system is the RSA system
developed in 1978.90 Because of the algorithm, the key lengths are
not comparable to DES in terms of strength. Rather, the security
of RSA depends on the difficulty in factoring extremely large
numbers. 9' With direct attacks on a strong 1024-bit RSA
implementation taking ten billion years, it is highly probable that
attack efforts will instead focus on uncovering the receiver's
private key.92
4. Key Management Terminology
Although many of the policy issues surrounding key
management are discussed in Part V of this Comment, it is
important to provide an overview of the terms used in the
discussion. As a police modification to secret-key and public-key
systems, sometimes "key recovery" is requested. 93 Although it is
referred to by various names, generally key recovery means "any
system... guarantee[ing] law enforcement agencies timely access,
introducing public and private keys).
87 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that public-key
authentication gives each user the responsibility of protecting her private key which is
crucial for no-repudiated digital signatures).
88 See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 285 (noting that the most common public-key
algorithm "is about 1000 times slower than DES").
89 See id.
90 See id. at 281-82. (describing the algorithm and its namesake inventors: Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman). By 1996 RSA was licensed to over 150
companies and claimed an installed base of 20 million users. See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ,
supra note 7, at 31.
91 See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 284 (mentioning that the "most paranoid" use
1024-bit RSA algorithms requiring prime numbers with 308 digits).
92 See id.
93 Today the term "key recovery" is used generically to represent a variety of
recovery schemes such as key escrow, trusted third-parties, exceptional access, and data
recovery. See Abelson et al., supra note 33, at Executive Summary.
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without user notice, to the plaintext of encrypted communications
traffic." 94 For any given system, this request is not technically
prohibitive, but complexity increases as a global infrastructure is
attempted. 95 Such key recovery systems rely on key escrow agents
to hold the private keys of all of its members.96 Some systems may
also employ key sharing, where escrow agents holds parts of user
private keys.97
B. An Export Primer
1. Regulatory History
Today's encryption export controls first appeared in 1949
when the United States implemented regulatory controls to
"prevent the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries from
obtaining Western technology that could enhance... [their]
military potential." 98  These controls were implemented by
enacting the Export Administration Act (EAA)9 9 and the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).'0° The regulations state that
the Department of Commerce is to use a Commerce Control List
(CCL) to classify items for export.' °' The list is divided into ten
categories: "Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment and
Miscellaneous; Materials, Chemicals, 'Microorganisms,' and
Toxins; Materials Processing; Electronics; Computers;
Telecommunications and Information Security; Lasers and
Sensors; Navigation and Avionics; Marine; and Propulsion
94 ld. at § 1.2.
95 See id. at § 3.2.1 (concluding that "[w]e simply do not know how to build a
collective secure key-management infrastructure of this magnitude, let alone operate
one.").
96 See id. at Executive Summary.
9 See CRYPTOGRAPHY FAQ, supra note 7, at 102.
98 Evans, supra note 5, at 474.
99 See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
1o See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (1998).
'0' See Evans, supra note 5, at 474-76 (describing the CCL and its international
underpinnings from the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM)); see also 15 C.F.R. § 738 (1998).
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Systems, Space Vehicles and Related Equipment."'0 ' The CCL
explains what controls are imposed, which countries are limited,
and what license an exporter needs to sell her products overseas.103
Although encryption items are currently controlled by EAR
through the Department of Commerce, it is important to note that,
at one time, they were controlled under the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA)' °4 and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).0 °5  Under ITAR, the Department of State controlled
encryption exports as defense articles on the United States
Munitions List (USML) until 1996.106 The only three cases to
challenge encryption export restrictions were all brought before
non-military encryption items were moved back under EAR
control. 0 7 Although the Executive Order transferring encryption
items from the USML to EAR control was part of President
Clinton's promised "sweeping changes in... export controls,"'' 8
software industry representatives and civil libertarian groups
viewed the move as "a pointless shell game."' 9 As the focus of
this Comment is on the EAR regulations as they exist today and in
the future, any ITAR similarities have little substantive effect on
102 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(a) (1998). These categories are then further divided into five
groups: Equipment, Assemblies and Components; Test, Inspection and Production
Equipment; Materials; Software; and Technology. See id. at § 738.2.(b).
103 But see Evans, supra note 5, at 476 (noting that "software is scattered
throughout the CCL, making it much more difficult to identify which software products
are subject to export controls").
'04 See22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1994).
105 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1998).
106 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (describing the USML); see also Exec. Order No. 13,026,
3 C.F.R. 228 (1998), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.S. app. § 2403 (Law. Co-op.
1998) (noting that encryption items transferred from the USML prior to Nov. 15, 1996
are not controlled as encryption items).
107 See infra notes 129-272 and accompanying text (describing encryption cases
attacking ITAR which turned to EAR after the regulatory shift).
'08 Remarks Announcing a National Export Strategy and an Exchange With
Reporters, 29 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Sept. 29, 1993).
1o Bill Pietrucha, Professor Wants Constitutional Review of Cryptography (visited
Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.info-sec.com/crypto/infosecz.html-ssi> (quoting John
Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation). This industry pessimism
resulted from the timing of the Executive Order. The Order came only days before a
California District Court ruled the ITAR provisions were unconstitutional prior
restraints. See id.; see infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
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the legal principles discussed.
2. Encryption Item Classifications
The new EAR regulations added a category called "Encryption
Items" (El) as a reason for control." ° This category includes "all
encryption commodities, software, and technology that contain
encryption features and are subject to the EAR.'"" The El
regulations also included three sub-categories of items falling
under telecommunications and information security that are
controlled for El reasons: encryption commodities, encryption
software, and encryption technology."2  Notably, these
classifications do not include software that employs encryption
only for authentication, encryption of passwords or personal
identification numbers, or certain banking or money machine
functions. "3  Further, the classifications also consider whether
items are "recovery encryption software and equipment," 4 which
are legally entitled by government officials to obtain the plaintext
of encrypted data and communications." 5 With the shift of items
to the CCL also came some encryption-specific exceptions to the
usual rules on software. Three noteworthy exceptions involve the
regulation of free software, the definition of export, and the
foreign availability impacts.
Before Executive Order 13,026, the EAR traditionally did not
impose any controls on software under its jurisdiction if the
software was freely available to any party."' However, a key
provision carried over from ITAR imposes full export control
jurisdiction over all encryption software, even software that is
otherwise available for free without any restriction." 7 Given the
"0 See 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(d)(2)(i)(A) (1998).
... 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1998).
112 See 15 C.F.R. § 742.15 (1998) (describing new categories ECCN 5A002, ECCN
5D002, and ECCN 5E002, respectively).
"13 See Fred M. Greguras & John Black, Internet Export Compliance Issues for
Software § II(A) (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.jya.com/inetxport.htm>.
114 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(2).
115 See id.
116 See Greguras & Black, supra note 113, § II.
117 See id.
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proliferation of free software on the Internet, this provides
distinctly broader control over encryption products than other
software technologies.
The second encryption-specific exception in the new EAR
regulations addresses the definition of "export." For non-
encryption software, export means "a shipment or transmission of
items ... out of the U.S.; or a 'release' of technology or source
code to a foreign national in the U.S."' 8  This differs from
encryption software, where "export" also includes: "downloading,
or causing the downloading of software to locations.., outside the
U.S.; or making such software available for transfer outside the
U.S.,.. . including transfers from electronic bulletin boards,
Internet file transfer protocol and WWW sites."' ' 9 According to
this definition, publishing software on a web page is considered an
export only when that software fits the EAR definition of
encryption software.'20 An exception is provided for such
publishing where "the person making the software available takes
precautions adequate to prevent unauthorized transfer of such code
outside of the United States." ' Compliance procedures must
either be pre-approved by the Commerce Department's Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA) or must control access by human or
automated means that:
checks the address of every system requesting or receiving a
transfer and verifies that such systems are located within the
U.S.; provides every requesting or receiving party with notice
that the transfer includes or would include cryptographic
software subject to export controls under the EAA and that
anyone receiving the transfer may not export the software
without a license; and [requires] every party requesting or
receiving a transfer of such software ... [to] acknowledge
118 Id. at § II(C)(I).
''9 Id. at § II(B) (emphasis added).
120 But see Greguras & Black, supra note 113, § III(C)(1) (mentioning that the
Bureau of Export Administration interprets "export" to include Internet access even for
non-encryption software when the provider receives information or "Red Flags" that
foreign parties are downloading). Although this interpretation appears to level
encryption and non-encryption software regulations, it is unlikely that "Red Flags"
would ever appear in the automated download environment of the Internet.
121 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(B)(ii) (1998).
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affirmatively that he or she understands that cryptographic
software is subject to export controls under the EAA and that
anyone receiving the transfer may not export the software
without a license.
22
In addition to the free software and export distinctions,
availability of equivalent foreign technology affects encryption
software differently than other software. Before the addition of
encryption software, all software on the CCL was excepted from
export control if that software was already available in foreign
countries.2 2 However, as encryption software moved to the CCL,
this foreign availability exception became limited only to non-
encryption software. As stated by President Clinton:
[E]xport of encryption products... [may] harm national
security and foreign policy interests even where comparable
products are or appear to be available from sources outside the
United States .... [P]rovisions of the EAA relating to foreign
availability, and the regulations in the EAR relating to such
EAA provisions, shall not be applicable with respect to export
• 124
controls on such encryption products.
One further encryption-specific provision added to the EAR
involves electronic publishing as opposed to printed material.
Section 734.3(b)(2) of the EAR states that "a printed book or other
printed material setting forth encryption source code is not itself
subject to the EAR."'' 25  However, "encryption source code in
electronic form or media ... remains subject to the EAR."'126 Thus,
source code in a book is not controlled by the EAR, whereas the
same source code on a computer disk may be forbidden or require
122 Greguras & Black, supra note 113, § II(C).
123 See 15 C.F.R. § 768 (1998).
124 Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1998), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C.S. app. § 2403 (Law. Co-op. 1998). In addition to making this distinction, the
administration also took the position that determining foreign availability was a subject
of national security and thus, "facts and questions concerning the foreign availability of
such encryption products cannot be made subject to public disclosure or judicial
review." Id.
125 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3) (1998) (quoting Note to Paragraphs (B)(2) and (B)(3) of
this section).
126 Id.
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a license under the EAR.' 27  The administration continues to
review this distinction and has "reserv[ed] the option to impose
export controls on [scannable encryption source code] for national
security and foreign policy reasons."'
28
III. Challenge in the Courts
The increased regulatory focus on encryption products
spawned an inevitable increase in export restriction challenges. In
particular, three cases have been decided in the last two years that
will shape the encryption export debate for years to come:
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State, 129 Karn v. U.S. Department
of State30 and Junger v. Daley.'3 ' Although the key constitutional
issues will be discussed in Part IV,'32 Part III describes the
background and primary holdings for each of these important
cases.
A. The Bernstein Quartet
Daniel Bernstein, a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics at the
University of California at Berkeley, worked in an area of applied
mathematics, cryptography, that seeks to develop confidentiality in
electronic communications. '  As part of his graduate studies,
"Bernstein developed an encryption algorithm he call[ed]
'Snuffle." ' 3 4 He articulated that algorithm in an academic paper
written in English and in source code written in "C," a high-level
programming language.' The source code resided in two files,
127 This regulatory anomaly was at the heart of an export restriction challenge in
Washington. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
128 Encryption Items Transferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce
Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572, 68,573 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 730,
732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 768, 772, 774).
129 Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). There are actually four
decisions originating from Bernstein's dispute. See infra notes 133-203.
10 925 F.Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996).
131 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
132 See infra notes 274-388 and accompanying text.
133 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1428-29.
'34 Id. at 1429.
135 Id.
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"Snuffie.c" and "Unsnuffle.c," which described the procedures for
encryption and decryption, respectively.' Once the source code• 137
was converted into "object code" through the use of compilers, a
computer could read the code and encrypt and decrypt data for a138
user. On June 30, 1992, Bernstein submitted a Commodity
Jurisdiction Request (CJR) 39 to the State Department to determine
whether the academic paper and the two source files were
controlled by ITAR. 140  After being notified that all items were
subject to licensing under ITAR, and following some contentious
correspondence on the point, Bernstein submitted a second CJR
asking for a separate determination for each of five items: (1) the
academic paper; (2) Snuffle.c; (3) Unsnuffle.c; (4) an English
description of how to use Snuffle; and (5) English instructions for
programming a computer to use Snuffle.c.14' Upon hearing from
the ODTC that all items were defense articles under ITAR,
Bernstein began the legal war that has generated four successive
battles in the Federal courts.
42
1. Bernstein I
In addition to appealing the CJR determination, Bernstein
brought an action in the Northern District of California seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the AECA
and ITAR. 43  Bernstein claimed that those regulations were
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him.' 44 In April
1996 Judge Marilyn Hall Patel ruled on the Department of State's
136 See id.
137 See id. at 1429 n.3 (describing the differences between source code and object
code as well as the translation process performed by compilers).
138 See id. at 1329 nn. 3-4.
139 A CJR is the formal name for a commodity application submitted to the export
governing body. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (1998).
141 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1430.
141 See id.
142 See infra notes 143-203 and accompanying text.
143 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1428.
'4 See id. at 1430-31. The plaintiff claiming that the ITAR imposed an
unconstitutional prior restraint on cryptographic speech, that a number of terms make
the ITAR vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, and that the ITAR
infringes the rights of association and equal protection. See id.
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motion to dismiss in Bernstein 1.145 In its motion, the defendant
relied on AECA language that states: "The designation by the
President (or by an official to whom the President's
functions... have been duly delegated), in regulations issued
under this section, of items as defense articles ... for purposes of
this section shall not be subject to judicial review."'146  In the
alternative, the defendant also claimed that the facts did not
present a colorable constitutional claim.1
47
Regarding the clear AECA language, Judge Patel noted that "a
review of a particular CJR decision is a distinctly different
question from a constitutional challenge to a statute."' 48 In finding
that Bernstein was challenging the statute rather than the CJR
decision, Judge Patel relied on an EAA decision, United States v.
Bozarov149 from the Ninth Circuit, which stated that "colorable
constitutional claims may be reviewed by the courts even when a
statute otherwise precludes judicial review."'5 °  Her position
gained further support from Webster v. Doe,5' in which the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear .... We
require this heightened showing in part to avoid the "serious
constitutional question" that would arise if a federal statute
were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim.
52
With this foundation, Judge Patel turned to analyze whether a
colorable constitutional claim existed. In particular, Judge Patel
inquired whether Bernstein's source code was protectable speech
'45 See id. at 1426.
146 Id. at 1431 (emphasis added) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h)).
147 See id. at 1432-33. Colorability, though often employed by the courts, is rarely
defined. The Ninth Circuit applied a standard that a "constitutional claim is not
colorable if it is clearly immaterial and made only for the purpose of jurisdiction, or 'is
wholly insubstantial or frivolous."' Id. (citing Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990, 991-92
(9th Cir. 1992)).
148 Id. at 1431.
149 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992).
1so Id. at 1044 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-05 (1988)).
151 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
152 Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
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under the First Amendment."' The defendant urged the court to
find the Snuffle source code unprotected conduct that was not
"'sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication' to fall
within the protections of the First Amendment. ' 154 Even if such
conduct was expressive, the defendant argued that "the relatively
mild O'Brien test should be employed." '155 The O'Brien test allows
regulation of conduct that incidentally restricts speech where: "(1)
it is within the power of government; (2) it furthers an important
or substantial government interest; (3) the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on speech is no greater than is essential to further that
interest." 1
5 6
In what may be the most far-reaching and significant holding
of all the encryption export cases, Judge Patel rejected the
government's arguments and found software to be protectable
expression under the First Amendment.' More specifically, the
court relied on a Ninth Circuit decision, Yniguez v. Arizonians for
Official English,' in distinguishing expressive conduct from
speech in the context of non-English languages.5 9 That court
stated:
Of course, speech in any language consists of the 'expressive
conduct' of vibrating one's vocal chords, moving one's mouth
and thereby making sounds, or of putting pen to paper, or hand
to keyboard. Yet the fact that such 'conduct' is shaped by
language-that is, a sophisticated and complex system of
understood meanings-is what makes it speech. Language is by
definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the
153 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1432-36. Although initial CJR determinations
also disallowed export of Bernstein's academic papers, the State Department reversed
their position after Bernstein filed suit. See id. at 1434. Judge Patel found it
"disquieting" that such papers were reclassified only after plaintiff initiated action. Id.
'I4 ld. at 1434 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
I ld. at 1436 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
156 Id. at 1436-37.
17 See id. at 1436.
158 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (vacated on other grounds).
'59 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1435.
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regulation of speech.'6°
By finding that the Snuffle source code was speech, Judge
Patel ruled that the plaintiff alleged "facts sufficient to state a
nonfrivolous First Amendment claim and hence that claim is
colorable."'' Closely related to this finding, Judge Patel also ruled
that the AECA and ITAR licensing scheme could act as a prior
restraint on that mode of speech.
62
2. Bernstein II
By December 2, 1996, Bernstein had become a Research
Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago and
planned to use his Snuffle code for teaching purposes. 1' Two of
his main concerns involved teaching the code to foreigners and
publishing it in journals or online discussion groups without a
license.'6 As there were no disputes of material fact, Judge Patel's
decision addressed cross-motions for summary judgment
regarding Bernstein's prior restraint, overbreadth, and vagueness
claims.165 Contrary to Bernstein I, which six months earlier cleared
up only the justiciability questions, Bernstein II reached the merits
of the constitutionality claims and appeared to provide the final
word on encryption export regulations. 66
Since the court in Bernstein I determined that source code is
speech and "both parties agreed that a licensing scheme controls
the 'export' of such speech," the Bernstein H court turned first to a
prior restraint analysis. 6 1 Judge Patel began by recognizing that
160 Yniquez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (emphasis added) (vacated on other grounds).
161 Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1437.
162 See id. at 1438. The court also found Bernstein's overbreadth and vagueness
claims to be nonfrivolous with little discussion. See id. at 1438-39.
163 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't. of State (Bernstein II), 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1296
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
'64 See id.
165 See id. at 1282.
166 Although the decision in Bernstein I was not appealed, Executive Order 13,026
transferred encryption export responsibility to the Department of Commerce and the
EAR so any further disputes had to be relitigated in light of the new regulations. See
Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1998), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.S. app.
§ 2403 (Law. Co-op. 1998).
167 Bernstein I1, 945 F. Supp. 15 2386.
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licensing schemes are a form of prior restraint' 6' and then applied
the Freedman169 test to determine whether there existed procedural
safeguards for the licensing scheme to pass constitutional
muster.'7 ° This test used by the Supreme Court requires that:
(1) any prior restraint to judicial review can be imposed only for
a specified brief period during which the status quo must be
maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision
must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of
going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden
of proof once in court."
When applying the test to the ITAR scheme, Judge Patel found
ITAR to be "a paradigm of standardless discretion, [that] fails on
every count." 2 She held that:
[b]ecause it fails to provide for a time limit on the licensing
decision, for prompt judicial review and for a duty on the part of
the ODTC to go to court and defend a denial of a license, the
ITAR licensing system as applied to [encryption products] acts
as an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment.'73
In contrast, the court was not as sympathetic to Bernstein's
arguments regarding vagueness and overbreadth. Judge Patel
noted that vague laws are objectionable for multiple reasons: they
fail to provide fair warning to those wishing to act lawfully; they
allow for arbitrary and discriminatory application; and they may
inhibit First Amendment rights because "uncertainty can cause
168 See id. at 1286. While prior restraints have often come in the form of judicial
injunctions on publication they are also recognized in licensing schemes. See FW/PBS,
Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
169 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965).
170 See Bernstein I1, 945 F. Supp. at 1286-92.
17' FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227 (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60).
172 Bernstein H, 945 F. Supp. at 1289.
173 Id. at 1290. The holding was somewhat different for Bernstein's technical data
claims, regarding teaching to foreigners. Although questioning the currency of the
precedent, Judge Patel effectively yielded to Ninth Circuit authority provided by United
States v. Edler, 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). See id. at 1290-92. That court adopted a
narrowing construction to save a statute from prior restraint infirmities. See Edler, 579
F.2d at 521.
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speakers to say less."' 74 However, for a facial vagueness claim to
survive, "the deterrent effect of the statute on protected expression
must be 'real and substantial' and not easily narrowed by a
court."'75  After recognizing that "defense articles," "defense
services," and "technical data" have overlapping meanings that
can be grounds for vagueness, Judge Patel chose to reword the
statute rather than void it.'76 Similarly, plaintiff's uncertainty over
the definitions of "technical data" and "exports" did not persuade
the court, as it refused to void application with those terms. 17  One
section which did garner Judge Patel's support as impermissibly
vague was § 120.11(a)(8), which exempted information available
to the public "through fundamental research in science and
engineering. ,171 Citing the likely confusion between cryptographic
algorithms published in scientific journals and those requiring
governmental approval, the court voided the academic exemption
sections for vagueness.'79 The court's consideration of overbreadth
was closely tied to its vagueness findings, and accordingly, it held
that "neither the definition of export nor the ITAR scheme as a
whole is unconstitutionally overbroad."'' "
Finally, Bernstein's request for a preliminary injunction for his
teaching activities was denied without prejudice. Judge Patel
reasoned that given the government's assertion that teaching a
cryptography class did not violate the regulations and that the
court found provisions of ITAR were an invalid prior restraint,
there was no immediate threat of injury and no need to rule on the
preliminary injunction.' Judge Patel closed by stating that
Bernstein may renew the motion if later threatened with
prosecution. 182
14 Bernstein II, 945 F. Supp. at 1292.
'I Id. (emphasis added) (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 60 (1976)).
176 See id. at 1293.
177 See id.
1 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8).
9 See Bernstein H, 945 F. Supp. at 1294.
"0 Id. at 1295.
... See id. at 1296.
182 See id.
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3. Bernstein III
Near the time of Judge Patel's decision holding that the ITAR
encryption regulations were unconstitutional prior restraints on
speech, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,026.183 The
order transferred jurisdiction over the export of nonmilitary
encryption products to the Department of Commerce pursuant to
the EAA.'84  After this Order was implemented, the plaintiff
amended his complaint to include the new regulations and new
defendants.'85 The case with these new regulations and defendants
has become known as Bernstein III.
Although trumpeted by the administration as "a plan to make it
easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products to protect
their privacy,"' 8 6 the transfer provided little change in regulating
encryption export. In fact, Judge Patel ultimately reached the
same conclusions about EAR as she previously had about ITAR,
holding that "the encryption regulations are an unconstitutional
prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment."'
18 7
The defendants did not argue that the regulations were notably
different, but instead presented arguments against some of the
reasoning in Bernstein H. The defendants protested that the
plaintiff's facial challenge was not applicable here because there
was "not a 'close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct
commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and
substantial threat of identified censorship risks."" 8  This test,
outlined in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing,'89
distinguished between laws directed at expression and those of
183 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein III), 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1291
(N.D. Cal. 1997); Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1998), reprinted as amended
in 50 U.S.C.S. app. § 2403 (Law. Co-op. 1998).
18 See id.
185 See id.
186 Encryption Items Transferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce
Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572, 68,573 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 730,
732, 734, 736, 738,740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 768, 772, 774).
187 Bernstein 111, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
88 Id. at 1304 (quoting the facial challenge test as stated in City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)).
189 486 U:S. 750 (1988).
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general applicability not aimed at expressive conduct.' 90 Judge
Patel disagreed with the defendants and found "the most common
expressive activities of scholars-teaching a class, publishing their
ideas, speaking at conferences, or writing to colleagues over the
Internet-are subject to a prior restraint by the export controls
when they involve cryptographic code or computer programs."'9'
In the alternative, the defendants noted BXA regulation
exceptions for printed materials that could address censorship
concerns.' 9 Judge Patel afforded no weight to such a concession
and even found that it could possibly exacerbate the potential for
self-censorship.'93 Further, Judge Patel held the print distinction
was irrational and was confounded by the defense explanation that
scanning print into software required a good deal of skill.' 94
Finally, she held that the print exception undermined the stated
purpose of the regulations and that, in light of Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union,'95 "not only is the distinction between print
and electronic media increasingly untenable, but the Internet is
subject to the same exacting level of First Amendment scrutiny as
print media."'96
With holdings similar to Bernstein II, Judge Patel afforded the
plaintiff injunctive relief but refused to wholly invalidate the
regulations.' 97 Due to the finding of facial invalidity the court
could have ordered nationwide relief, but the novel and complex
issues involved warranted Judge Patel's granting of narrow relief
pending appeal.' 9 The defendants were "enjoined from enforcing
'9' See id. at 759-62.
'9' Bernstein 111, 974 F. Supp. at 1305.
'92 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(2) (1998). For example, these exceptions include
printed books, maps, newspapers, and films. See id.
'93 See Bernstein 111, 974 F. Supp. at 1306 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 68,578 (1996) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 734.3)).
'9' See id. (noting that the effect of the dichotomy would be to make it more
difficult only for the more inept).
'9' 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding that the Internet is the most participative medium
available in the world and holding that expression over the Internet deserves a protection
of free expression at least equivalent to print media).
196 Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 1306-07.
'9' See id. at 1309-10.
'98 See id. at 1310.
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the regulations against the plaintiff or against anyone who seeks to
use, discuss or publish plaintiff's encryption program."'99
4. Bernstein IV
The government appealed the Bernstein III order to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals whereupon Judge Patel issued a limited
order enforcing Bernstein. °° For the first and only time to date,
the constitutionality of encryption export regulations was
considered by a circuit court. In addition to the Opening and
Opposition briefs submitted by the parties, Amicus Briefs
supporting Bernstein were submitted by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression, the National Computer Security
Association, a group of constitutional law professors, and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. 0 Oral
arguments were held December 8, 1997 before Judges Myron
Bright, Betty Fletcher, and Thomas Nelson. °2 A year later, the
three judge panel has yet to issue a decision.
B. The Karn Experience
Engineer Philip R. Karn undertook a journey through
encryption export regulations and the federal courts, which
204paralleled the Bernstein cases. In early 1994, Karn filed (with
the U.S. State Department) a pair of CJRs: one for the printed
'99 Id. (describing the fact-specific remedy and noting also that the Bernstein H
order was superseded by this one).
200 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Court Allows Unlicensed Crypto Export
(visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bemstein vDoS/
19970829.pressrel> (press release announcing Judge Patel's limiting order pending
review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
201 See McGlashan and Sarrail, P.C., Bernstein Pleadings (visited Sept. 5, 1998)
<http://www.arceneaux.com/mcglash/pleadings.html>.
202 An unofficial transcript of those oral arguments has been made available by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). See EFF, Unofficial Transcript (visited Sept. 5,
1998) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein-v_DoS/Legal/971208_unofficial.
transcript>.
203 See id.
204 Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
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book Applied Cryptography.5 which contains cryptographic
algorithms, and one for a disk containing a verbatim copy of those
same cryptographic algorithms. °6 When export of the book was
allowed and export of the disk was denied, Kam filed suit in a case
that appeared to highlight the irrational distinctions of ITAR
encryption regulations.2 °7  However, inconsistencies in the
regulations made little difference when the legal battle became the
justiciability of the issue.208 Judge Charles R. Richey of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, found the issue to be a
"'political question' for the two elected branches under Articles I
and II of the Constitution. '"2 °9
Judge Richey's opinion presented a methodical jurisdiction
analysis for the regulations and their review. To begin, he
established that the AECA authorized the President to control the
export of "defense articles" and that authority was properly
delegated to the Secretary of State who promulgated the ITAR.2 °
That regulation specifically included cryptographic systems and
components as defense articles on the munitions list.21   Kam
argued that the diskette algorithms, like the book algorithms, were
in the public domain and the commodity jurisdiction procedure
improperly considered them a defense article.212 The question then
became whether the case was about reviewing the classification or
interpreting the restriction for items classified as defense articles.
Judge Richey viewed this as an attempt to challenge the
classification of encryption software as a defense article and
quoted ITAR language stating that "designation ... of items as
205 BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1994).
206 See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3-4.
207 "Id. at 1. Karn brought the suit to challenge what he considered to be "silly
rules" governing export of cryptographic software, including software in the public
domain. Philip R. Karn, The Applied Cryptography Case (visited Oct. 31, 1997)
<http://people.qualcomm.com/karn/export/index.html>.
208 See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 4-8.
209 Id. at 3 (granting the government's motion to dismiss).
210 See id. at 4-5 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) and 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a)).
211 See id. at 5 (citing 2 C.F.R. § 120.4, category XIII).
212 See id. (citing 22 C.F.R. §§ 125.1, 120.11).
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defense articles ... shall not be subject to judicial review."" 3 Karn
argued that "there is a presumption in favor of judicial review of
agency action absent 'clear and convincing evidence' of legislative
intent to preclude it. 2 14 Judge Richey, however, noted Supreme
Court warnings that "this standard is not a rigid evidentiary test
but a useful reminder to the courts"25  and may be overcome by
express language or other related factors. 6  Given the express
prohibition in the statute, objectives of the AECA,217 and the
potential for introducing inconsistency and confusion, Judge
Richey held that judicial review of the issue was barred.2 '
Turning to Karn's alternative argument, Judge Richey
considered whether the regulations were an unconstitutional prior
restraint on expression.219 His analysis differed greatly from the
Bernstein rulings as he concluded that ITAR encryption
regulations were constitutional. 220  Here the government won its
argument that the regulations were content-neutral22' and thus must
only meet the O'Brien222 test: "whether the regulation is (1) within
the constitutional power of the government, (2) 'furthers an
important or substantial government interest,' and (3) is narrowly
tailored to the government interest. 223 This test generally applies
to conduct, therefore, Judge Richey rejected Karn's claim that his
213 Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h)).
214 Id. at 6 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Phys., 476 U.S. 667, 671
(1986)).
215 Id. (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984)).
216 See id. (citing Block, 467 U.S. at 345). Additional factors include the structure
of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the
administrative action involved. See id.
27 See id. (quoting in part 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1)) (noting the AECA aim to further
"world peace and the security and foreign policy" of the United States).
218 See id. at 6-8.
219 See id. at 9-13.
220 See id. at 12-13.
221 This conclusion was opposite that of the Bernstein court, where the regulations
were considered content-based. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein I), 922
F. Supp. 1426, 1436-37 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
222 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also infra notes 316-18
(describing the O'Brien test).
223 Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10 (quoting in part O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
1998]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
diskette was "pure speech. 224 Applying the O'Brien test, the court
held that all three criteria were met; thus the regulations did not
violate the Constitution.25 On the grounds that the court could not
decide political questions, Judge Richey also declined to consider
Karn's argument that the goal of national security was not
furthered because of foreign availability. 6 Karn's remaining
arguments, which Judge Richey termed "last-ditch, 227 were
rejected and the defendants were awarded a dismissal on the
regulatory authority issue and summary judgment on the plaintiff's
228
constitutional claims . Philip Karn subsequently appealed the
government's victory, but Executive Order 13,026 prompted the
parties to restart the licensing process under the new EAR
scheme. 9 Judge Louis Oberdorfer replaced Judge Richey to hearfurter isp es n th .. 230
further disputes in the matter. In April 1998, Karn's CJR was
formally rejected and he submitted an amended complaint to Judge
Oberdorfer. 3' The government has also filed a motion to
dismiss.232
C. The Recent Junger Bid
Professor Peter D. Junger from Case Western Reserve Law
School filed the most recent challenge to the encryption export
233
regulations. To aid in teaching his course "Computers and the
Law," Junger used encryption programs3 and a course book
224 Id.
225 See id. at 11.
226 See id. at 10-12.
227 Id. at 12.
228 See id. at 12-14 (finding Kan's vagueness and Fifth Amendment arguments
unpersuasive).
229 See Philip A. Karn, Detailed History of the Applied Cryptography Case (visited
Oct. 18, 1998) <http://people.qualcomm.com/karn/export/history.html>.
230 Judge Richey passed away in March, 1997. See id.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
234 Professor Junger created a short one-time pad algorithm and referenced other
sample encryption programs for teaching purposes. Telephone Interview with Peter
Junger, Plaintiff (Nov. 2, 1997).
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which contained encryption source code.235 Further, he wrote a
law review article on encryption and maintained a web page with
236links to domestic and foreign encryption sites. Use of these
items was potentially an export, as defined by BXA, and thus,
Junger submitted CJRs for all of them."' The programs, with the
exception of a one-time pad algorithm Junger created,23 were
"classified as 'El' software, meaning that they could not be
exported without a license."'239 This classification meant that any
electronic publication of the programs in Junger's course book or
law review article would violate the EAR as export without a
240license. In Junger v. Daley,'4 Professor Junger sought injunctive
and declaratory relief from the government's enforcement of
export controls on encryption software.2 42 The case was heard July
2, 1998 in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio by
243Judge James S. Gwin.
Professor Junger and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce filed
cross-motions for summary judgment in the case based primarily
on the interpretation of the First Amendment.24  The arguments for
each side were substantially similar to those presented in the
235 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d
708 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (No. 96 CV 1723) (visited Nov. 2, 1997)
<http://www.jya.com/pdj4.htm>.
236 See generally id. at 19.
237 See id. at 3. Professor Junger also submitted five descriptions of encryption
programs. See id. These items were refused because none of them identified a specific
software program. The BXA Director noted that "licensing controls on encryption
software that does not maintain the secrecy of information may vary depending on how
the algorithm is implemented in the software." Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
238 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the category of algorithms
that includes one-time pads).
239 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d
708 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (No. 96 CV 1723) (visited Nov. 2, 1997)
<http://www.jya.com/pdj4.htm>.
240 See id. (noting that Junger's encryption programs would have to be removed
before his book was published on a website).
241 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 711.
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Bernstein series of cases. 245  Professor Junger's five-count
complaint claimed: (1) the export licensing scheme worked a
prior restraint on his right to publish scholarly materials; (2) the
export regulations were unconstitutionally overbroad and vague;
(3) the export regulations engage in unconstitutional content
discrimination; (4) the export regulations restrict his academic
freedom and freedom of association; and (5) the executive
regulation of encryption software under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act246 violated the separation of
powers doctrine.2 47 Along with counts 4 and 5, which were
decided on non-constitutional grounds Judge Gwin rejectedS•• 249
each of Junger's constitutional attacks on the export regulations.
The result was a decision that viewed Bernstein-like facts and
arguments from a different, and possibly less technically savvy,
perspective, and provided a significant split of federal judicial
opinion.
After setting forth the applicable legal standards, Judge Gwin
addressed the question of whether encryption software isc o n s i t u t o nal y p r t e c t d • 2 5 0
constitutionally protected expression. Because encryption
software, when run on a computer, can be functional, the court
categorized it as "occasionally expressive conduct" rather than
"speech. ' '25' The court looked for an "overwhelmingly apparent" '252
245 See supra notes 133-203 and accompanying text (describing the competing
arguments and resolutions in the Bernstein cases).
246 See Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 712 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
247 See id. at 711-12.
248 See id. at 720-23. Because academic freedom and freedom of association were
not addressed in the submitted briefs, Judge Gwin considered that argument waived by
Junger. See id. at 723. The separation of powers question was settled by the court
claiming a lack of jurisdiction to review the President's authority. See id. (citing Dalton
v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994), which states "that such review is not available
when the statute in question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.").
249 See id. at 715-20.
250 See id. at 715-18.
251 Id. at 717 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)). Note,
however, that this approach presumes treatment of software as conduct rather than
speech. By the court's own admission, "[w]hether the alleged 'speech' is actually
expressive is immaterial if it is communicated through language." Id. at 716. A critical
assumption by the court which goes unsupported, is that computer "language" is not a
language even though the court admits that computer scientists use it to do their
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or "unmistakable message ' 253 in the expressive elements of
encryption source code and failed to find one.5 4  This
determination was critical to Judge Gwin's analysis as he
proceeded to the issue of prior restraint. Citing City of Lakewood
v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. ,255 the court rejected Junger's facial
challenge to the export regulations because such an attack "is
appropriate only where the challenged statute 'is directed narrowly
and specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated
with expression.' 25 6 The court found that the export regulations
were not narrowly directed at expressive conduct and, therefore,
257
were not a prior restraint.
Turning to Junger's overbreadth and vagueness claim, the
court noted that such "challenges are 'strong medicine' that should
be used 'sparingly and only as a last resort."'258 Further, the court
adhered to the rule that overbreadth attacks are inapplicable
"where the law effects [sic] the plaintiff and third parties in the
same manner." 259  Judge Gwin ruled that the potential injury to
Junger was the same as that to "other academics., 260  Thus, the
research. See id. at 717 (conceding that "trained computer programmers can read and
write in source code").
252 Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
253 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
254 See id. Evidently, submissions by Junger that many people used source code to
communicate messages carried little weight with Judge Gwin. See Email Interview with
Cindy A. Cohn, McGlashan & Sarrail, P.C. (Sept. 8, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Cohn Email]. It appears that Judge Gwin considered the number of people
who understand a message to be a proxy for the gravity of its expressive element.
However, Judge Gwin presented no authority for the implied assumption that the
number of people who communicate in a given language is critical in deciding whether
that communication is speech. See id.
255 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
256 Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 718 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988)).
257 See id. at 719.
258 Id. (citing New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14
(1988) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1988))).
259 Id.
260 Id. By considering only "other academics" Judge Gwin ignored declarations
submitted by Junger that non-academics had been injured in various ways by the export
regulations. See Cohn Email, supra note 254.
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court found such injury could not be the basis of an overbreadth
challenge.261 Junger's claim of vagueness was likewise dismissed
as Judge Gwin felt that the regulations were sufficiently detailed.262
Finally, Junger's content discrimination claim was rejected in a
two-part analysis focusing on level of scrutiny and application of
that scrutiny. 263 The court looked first at the appropriate level of
scrutiny for the encryption export regulations. 4  Contrary to
Junger's assertion that strict scrutiny should apply, the court felt
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because it found the export
regulations to be content neutral. The overriding factor in this
determination was the government's purpose.266 Even though
encryption software is subject to a stricter standard than other
software, Judge Gwin was satisfied that the regulations targeted
"encryption software [function] without reference to any views it
,,26
may express. ' 67 The court also applied this reasoning to reject
Junger's claim that allowing print but not electronic export of
encryption software was media discrimination contrary to Reno v.
26American Civil Liberties Union. 66 Much like the Karn court,
Judge Gwin applied intermediate scrutiny, and specifically the
261 See Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 719.
262 See id. at 720 (noting that "the export regulations even contain a description of
the key length in 'bits' for regulated programs").
263 See id. at 720-23.
264 See id. at 720-21.
26 See id.
266 See id. at 720 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(holding that the government's purpose is "the controlling consideration")).
267 Id. at 720. Note, however, that the very nature of the software makes it difficult
to separate its function from its expression. It is difficult, if not impossible, to modify
source code to retain its expressive message while modifying its function to conform to
export regulations. Thus, while claiming to control function, the regulations equally
restrict expression. Bernstein's counsel has noted that "[tlo mandate key recovery is to
mandate that computer programs have different content than they would otherwise; it's
like saying that the government wants to control the 'taste' of chocolate cake rather than
the recipe. Change one, you must change the other." Cohn Email, supra note 254.
268 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (stating that "our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet]"). Judge Gwin also distinguished Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union by
stating that encryption software, unlike pornography on the Internet, is "fundamentally
and functionally different in electronic form than when in print form." Junger, 8 F.
Supp.2d at 721.
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O'Brien test.26 9 The court found that all three prongs of that test
were satisfied and ruled that "[b]ecause the content neutral export
regulations at issue enable the government to collect vital foreign
intelligence, are not directed at a source code's ideas, and do not
burden more speech than necessary, they satisfy intermediate
scrutiny. 27°
Having rejected all five counts raised by Junger, Judge Gwin
denied summary judgment for Junger and granted summary
judgment for the government.27' Professor Junger intends to
appeal Judge Gwin's decision, but until either Junger or Bernstein
is reversed, a significant split between federal courts remains.272
IV. The Constitutional Battlefield
Much of the current debate surrounding the export of
encryption software is taking place in legislative sessions as
Congress looks for ways to balance the social realities of the
information age with the guarantee of rights inherent in our
political system. This part of the Comment discusses key
constitutional issues that any export legislation must address and
describes how the current regulations fare under constitutional
scrutiny."' After the constitutional foundation is laid, the
subsequent part of this Comment discusses many of the policy
arguments presented by each side of the debate, including how
other countries are dealing with the encryption dilemma. 4
As seen in Part III, recent challenges to the EAR scheme cite
the first, and possibly most cherished right of U.S. citizenship-,
freedom of expression.275 As earlier portions of this Comment
269 See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing the result of Karn's
application of the O'Brien test).
270 Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 723.
271 See id. at 723-24.
272 See Peter Junger, Federal District Court Holds That Software Publishers Are Not
Protected by the First Amendment-Government Wins Summary Judgment in Junger v.
Daley (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp-law/jvd/pressrel-
070798.txt> (press release announcing the Junger result and highlighting the clear split
between the Bernstein and Junger courts).
273 See infra notes 281-393 and accompanying text.
271 See infra notes 390-468 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 153-62, 219-25 and accompanying text.
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illustrated, much of the debate centers on whether software is aproteted " 276
protected expression. Decisions in the recent encryption cases
have not provided a clear answer."' Other constitutional
arguments involve indirect infringement of rights springing from
the Fourth Amendment right to privacy and the Fifth AmendmentS 278
Due Process guarantees. These arguments do not suggest that
infringement occurs directly by restricting encryption producers'
rights. Rather, they claim that encryption user rights are infringed
indirectly by limiting export.279 Although there are a number of
other constitutional positions one could take, this Comment
focuses on the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment arguments that
form the battlefield of most legal and legislative debates.
A. Freedom of Expression in a Programming Language
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate
the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free
assembly .... Therein lies the security of the Republic, the
281very foundation of constitutional government.
Given that computers and the Internet were unknown when the
Bill of Rights was drafted, the U.S. government and its citizens are
276 See supra notes 153-62, 167-73, 186-99, 219-28, 244-57 and accompanying
text.
277 See Paul Wallich, Cracking the U.S. Code, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, April, 1997,
at I (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.sciam.com/0497issue/0497cyber.html>
(reporting that California and Washington, D.C. courts have issued "diametrically
opposed opinions" about the legitimacy of government controls over encryption).
278 See infra notes 362-88 and accompanying text.
279 Although relying on cherished Constitutional rights, these arguments are more
complex and indirect and, thus, have not garnered the same acceptance as the First
Amendment positions. See infra notes 362-88 and accompanying text.
280 The restriction on electronic publication could endanger freedom of the press as
guaranteed by the First Amendment. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I. This freedom
may also be indirectly infringed if reporters cannot use strong encryption while
researching dangerous subject matter. Further, the Freedom of Assembly is endangered
whenever the government requires the ability to track your correspondence. Encryption
controls, and specifically the push for key-recovery, could limit association between
parties who fear a government's prying eye. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
281 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (Hughes, C.J., writing for
majority).
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fighting over modem interpretation of the First Amendment which
provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech." '282  In considering encryption software
regulations, the initial First Amendment questions must be
whether software is speech and, if so, whether its topic can limit
the protection it is afforded. Surprisingly, Bernstein I was the first
case to hold specifically that software was speech for First
Amendment purposes."' This is surprising because software was
accepted for copyright as early as 1964284 and Congress confirmed
that approach in 1980 by passing the Computer Software
Copyright Act which categorized computer programs as
copyrightable literary works."285
In Bernstein I Judge Patel did not rely on encryption
software's copyrightability, but instead based her holding on the
nature and properties of software.286  In equating computer
languages to spoken languages, the court relied on Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English,"' which concluded that language
by its "sophisticated and complex system of understood meanings
[is speech]. Language is by definition speech, and the regulation
282 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
283 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein I), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434-36
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
284 See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 15-16 (1979). This approach would be incorporated as law
when Congress adopted CONTU recommendations that programs be copyrightable. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1994); Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a)-(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
285 See Computer Software Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988).
286 See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1435. Professor Junger also relied on this in
noting that "[p]rograms are a medium of expression for programmers, computer
scientists and anyone, like Professor Junger, 'whose ideas are described or demonstrated
with the help of computer code."' Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Junger
v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (No. 96 CV 1723) (visited Nov. 2, 1997)
<http://www.jya.com/pdj4.htm>.
287 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) cert. granted, -- U.S. -- , 116 S. Ct.
1316 (U.S. 1996). The case involved a constitutional challenge to the "English-only
provision amended to Arizona's constitution." Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1435 (citing
Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934). The Yniguez defendants unsuccessfully "sought to
characterize one's choice of language as expressive conduct. The court was similarly
'unpersuaded by the comparison between speaking languages other than English and
burning flags."' Id. (quoting Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934).
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of any language is the regulation of speech. 2 88  Advocates note
that computer language will become even more analogous to the
spoken word as future generations of automatic-programming
software begin to take general programming ideas from a user and
construct the necessary software. s9  With such technology, the
government will be hard-pressed to argue that such general ideas
are distinguishable from ordinary speech.29°
If software is speech, the next question becomes whether the
topic of that speech could limit its protection under the First
Amendment. Even the spoken word is not protected for "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words."2 9' Such utterances are considered of such slight
social value that any benefit derived from them is outweighed by
the social interest in peace and morality. Can computer "speech"
be similarly limited because it discusses ideas for encryption? In
Karn the court acknowledged the Supreme Court's view on the
right to free speech as preventing "the government from
proscribing speech because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed., 293  To date the government has not suggested that
encryption content removes software from protected expression;
rather, its view has consistently been that the functional qualities
of programming code allow it to be regulated as conduct.2 94 This
288 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (emphasis added). Building on this spoken-word
equivalence, Judge Patel, in Bernstein 1, found "no meaningful difference between
computer language... and German or French." Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1435. But
see Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 716 (arguing that "'[s]peech' is not protected simply because
we write it in a language.").
289 See Telephone Interview with Peter Junger, Plaintiff (Nov. 2, 1997).
290 See Wallich, supra note 277, at 1.
291 Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Speech From Conduct, 45 MERCER L. REV.
621, 625 (1994) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569, 572 (1942)).
Loewy notes that such words inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. See id. at 627-28.
292 See id. at 626 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
293 Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded per
curiam, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 381-82 (1992)).
294 See Encryption Items Transferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572, 68,573 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§§ 730, 732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 768, 772, 774) (stating that "export
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line of reasoning was the cornerstone of Judge Gwin's finding that
"[i]n the overwhelming majority of circumstances, encryption
source code is exported to transfer functions, not to communicate
ideas."2 95
B. The Line Between Expression and Conduct
The government has received mixed support for its claim that
the functional qualities of software limit its First Amendment
protection. Although Karn assumed software was speech, it
embraced the government's approach and applied legal doctrines
particular to regulating conduct.! The Bernstein decisions,
however, rejected this approach and claimed that whether
programming code is functional is immaterial because
"functionality of a language does not make it any less like
speech."' 97 Professor Junger trumpeted the dangers of regulating
functional speech, noting that acknowledged expressions such as
legal form books, political pamphlets, and books of sermons all
have functional characteristics 9
The functionality question is key to understanding the proper
legal standard. A facial challenge to such government regulation
is applicable only where there is a "close enough nexus to
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to
of encryption software, like export of encryption hardware, is controlled because of th[e]
functional capacity to encrypt information on a computer system, and not because of any
informational or theoretical value that such software may reflect, contain, or represent,
or that its export may convey to others abroad.").
295 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d 708, 716 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
296 See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10.
297 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein I), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D.
Cal. 1996). Judge Patel further noted that while "instructions, do-it-yourself manuals,
recipes, [and] even technical information about hydrogen bomb construction are often
purely functional; they are also speech." Id. (citing United States v. The Progressive,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979)).
298 See Press Release, Summary Judgment Motion Filed in Suit Attacking
Restrictions on the "Export" of Software, (Oct. 16, 1997) (visited Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp-law/jvdlpr-brief.txt> (noting that censorship of
such expression is what led to the First Amendment). But see Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at
716-18. In Junger, Judge Gwin rejected Professor's Junger's analogies to functional
printings, relying heavily on the observation that unlike "a recipe [that] provides
instructions to a cook, source code is a device ... that actually does the function of
encryption." Id. at 717.
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pose a real and substantial threat of identified censorship risks. 299
The Supreme Court has entertained facial freedom-of-expression
challenges only against statutes that "by their terms" sought to
regulate words or expressive conduct.3 ' The encryption export
licensing scheme appears to have the required nexus; it prohibits
publication without a license.3"' The more contentious and yet
unresolved questions become what standard should be applied to
such a licensing scheme and whether that standard has been met
by the government. On this determination the Bernstein, Karn,
and Junger courts again disagreed, and it is unclear what standard
applies for encryption regulations. The following section
describes the proper tests for such regulations and discusses how
those tests have been applied in the encryption context.
C. Prior Restraints on Protected Expressions
Freedom of expression analysis focuses both on an expression
and its regulation. Assuming there is an expression, restriction of
it is governed by First Amendment principles including the
doctrine of "prior restraint."3 2 This doctrine has been used in two
299 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988).
Lakewood involved a newspaper challenge to a city ordinance requiring annual permits
for newsracks on public property. See id. The Court contrasted laws directed at
expression, such as one governing the circulation of newspapers, with laws of general
applicability not aimed at conduct commonly associated with expression, such as law
requiring building permits. See id. at 760-61.
30 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973)). At issue in Roulette was an ordinance that
prohibited people from sitting or lying on public sidewalks in certain areas and at certain
times. See id. The court held that "[t]he fact that sitting can possibly be expressive,
however, isn't enough to sustain plaintiffs' facial challenge." Id.
301 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein III), 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1305
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that the scheme adversely affects scientists, programmers, and
anyone working with encryption software to the extent that they cannot publish their
scholarly research until removing algorithms or getting government permission).
302 The doctrine of "prior restraint" is usually traced to the English Licensing Act of
1662, which required an official license prior to any publication. Allen M. Shinn, Jr.,
Note, The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free Speech on Scientific and
Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 368, 382 n.89 and accompanying text (1990)
(citations omitted). Blackstone provided an early view of the doctrine: "[t]he liberty of
the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published." Id.
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distinctly different situations: "administrative licensing
schemes ... and judicially imposed injunctions."3 3  The first
category is most applicable to encryption regulations and has been
applied to invalidate licensing schemes for pamphlets,3°4 motion
pictures,05 and parades and processions.0 6 The Supreme Court has
noted that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights .... If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil
sanction after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it
at least for the time. 3 7
This "freezing" effect of prior restraints plays a very definite
role in the encryption regulation debate. A National Research
Council (NRC) report commissioned by the Defense Department
on cryptography policy found "that companies were reluctant to
express their full dissatisfaction with the rules and implementation
of [encryption] export controls."3 8 They feared that "any explicit
connection between critical comments and their company might
result in unfavorable treatment of a future application for an export
license for one of their products.,, 3°9 Lest there be any claim of
unwarranted company paranoia, it is disturbing to note Admiral
Bobby Inman's warning, as Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, to members of the academic community to
cooperate with technology export controls or risk "far more
serious threats to academic freedom. 31 °
303 Id.
" See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Court reversed a Jehovah's
Witness conviction for distributing pamphlets in violation of an ordinance requiring a
permit prior to distributing "literature of any kind." Id. at 447.
305 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (invalidating a statute
requiring a license for showing motion pictures).
306 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (invalidating a
city ordinance forbidding parades or processions without a permit).
307 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (citation omitted).
308 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein 1II), 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1308 n.25
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of
Sciences, Cryptograph's [sic] Role in Securing the Information Society C-2
(prepublication copy May 30, 1996)).
309 Id. (quoting NRC Report at 4-29).
3 10 Gina Kolata, CIA Director Warns Scientists, 215 SCIENCE 383 (1982).
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1. The Many Tests for Prior Restraints
While the Supreme Court has never embraced per se invalidity
of prior restraints,"' "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression
comes to [the] Court with a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity."32  For any scheme to meet this
presumption, the government has the burden of justifying the
restraint, but the exact standard it must meet is unclear. There are
at least four tests involved in this determination, but their
interrelation is complex."' The following understanding of the
tests appears to be most consistent with federal court uses.
a. Why the Restraint?
The first determination involves whether the regulations are
content-neutral or content-based. In other words, does the restraint
limit expression specifically because of its content or incidentally
as part of implementing a content-neutral scheme?3 4  Content-
based regulations warrant strict scrutiny and are generally held to
be unconstitutional.3 3 Although content-neutral regulations are
subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny, the standard constitutional
ends-means analysis has not been consistently applied. Instead,
different analyses are applied depending on whether expression or
conduct is regulated.
b. The O'Brien Test for Regulating Conduct
In the case of content-neutral regulations of conduct, a four-
3" See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731 (1971) (per
curiam) (White, J., concurring); see also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
312 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (citations omitted)). New York Times, better known as the
Pentagon Papers case, involved the publishing of sensitive military documents during
the Vietnam War. See id.
313 In fact, commentator Geoffrey R. Stone found at least seven seemingly different
standards for content-neutral review. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48-54 (1987).
314 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-87 (1992).
115 See Jill M. Ryan, Note, Freedom to Speak Unintelligibly: The First Amendment
Implications of Government-Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165,
1200 (1996).
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pronged test similar to the ends-means analysis was established in
United States v. O'Brien.3t6 Referred to as the O'Brien test, it was
applied in upholding the government prohibition against burning
draft cards.317 The test questions whether the regulation is within
the constitutional power of the government, furthers an important
or substantial government interest, is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, and the incidental restriction on speech is no
greater than is essential to further the governmental interest.'
c. The Freedman Test for Regulating Expression
Regarding content-neutral regulations of expression, a more
stringent test has been applied in addition to heightened scrutiny.
Unlike the O'Brien test, which focuses on authority to regulate,
the test applied in Freedman v. Maryland 9 focuses on the
procedural safeguards inherent in the regulations. 1  The Court
recognized the danger inherent in prior restraints, as a government
official, rather than a judicial process, holds the delicate
responsibility of regulating the permissibility of speech."' The
Court outlined three procedural safeguards that comprise the
Freedman test: (1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be
imposed only for a brief and specified period during which the
status quo prevails; (2) expeditious judicial review must be
available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to
court to suppress speech and, once there, bears the burden of
proof.322 In addition to these three considerations, the Court has, at
different times, imposed two other requirements, namely the
316 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
317 See id.; see also supra notes 155-56 (describing the O'Brien test).
318 See id. at 377. The "narrowly tailored" test can also be seen as two separate
tests involving whether (1) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression and (2) the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is essential
to further that interest. See id.
3'9 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
320 See id.
321 See id. at 58 (holding that "a noncriminal process which requires the prior
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system").
322 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (citing Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965)).
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restraint must impose "narrow, objective and definite standards to
limit the discretion of the licensing officials," '323 and the
government must establish a threat of "direct, immediate and
irreparable harm.,
324
2. Application to Encryption Export Licensing
Although applying the above tests to encryption regulations
may appear straightforward, the courts have shown otherwise.
The Bernstein III court disagreed with the Karn and Junger courts
on each of the major determinations. As an initial matter, only the
Bernstein III court referred to the restrictions as prior restraints and
thus acknowledged a presumption of invalidity. 25 All three courts
agreed, however, that the regulations involved were content-
neutral.3 26  The analysis in Bernstein III diverged from the
approaches adopted in Karn and Junger on considering whether
expression or conduct was regulated. The Bernstein III court
focused on the expression inherent in encryption software and
applied the stringent Freedman factors . 2  The Kan court
accepted the government's argument that export conduct was the
regulation focus and thus considered O'Brien to be the proper
test. 28  The Junger court short-circuited the entire prior restraint
analysis by declaring that "encryption software is not typically
expression, [and thus] a facial challenge does not succeed. 3 29
323 Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992)
(quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
324 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (per curiam)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
325 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein III), 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1304
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that prior restraints begin with a presumption of invalidity).
326 See id. at 1307; Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996),
remanded per curiam, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d
708, 720-21 (N.D. Ohio 1998). Note that the restrictions actually appear content-based
because they focus on encryption content. Nevertheless, Judge Patel applied content-
neutral review and ruled that the regulations failed even that lighter standard. See
Bernstein 111, 974 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
327 See Bernstein II, 974 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
328 See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10-11.
329 Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 718 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (noting that "[e]ven if the Export
Regulations have impaired the isolated expressive acts of academics like Plaintiff
Junger, exporting software is typically non-expressive.").
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Before applying the Freedman factors, the Bernstein III court
considered the government interest involved.33 ° The claimed, and
likely actual, end to be served by encryption regulations was
national security."' This interest carries substantial weight in
constitutional analysis. However, national security alone has been
deemed too amorphous a rationale to abrogate the protections of
the First Amendment.332 Although not specifically mentioned in
the analysis, the test for "direct and irreparable harm" is closely
tied to the national security issues considered. 3  In fact, the
Bernstein III result may have been different if direct and
334irreparable harm had been at issue.
Turning to the first of the Freedman factors, the court
considered whether the regulations require licensing decisions
within a specific and reasonable period of time.335 Although export
applications are resolved or referred to the President within ninety
336days, there is no time limit placed on an application once
referred to the President.3 Even the appeals process only required
decisions "within a reasonable time after receipt of the appeal.""33
The second factor, which requires prompt judicial review, further
leaves the regulations infirm because it considers agency decisions
330 See Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 1307.
"' See id.
332 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) repudiated an absolute security interest in no uncertain terms).
313 See id.
134 With regard to encryption export, the government has never claimed direct and
irreparable harm; rather, security arguments rely on rationale generally reserved for
"secondary effects." The "secondary effects" doctrine considers the harm caused after
viewing a restricted expression (for example, pornographic movies instigating sex
crimes). See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The secondary
effects rationale has never been extended beyond sexually explicit speech. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (refusing to apply the rationale to political speech); see also
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (considering the
secondary effects doctrine in relation to a statute regulating speech on the Internet).
335 See Bernstein I, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
336 See 15 C.F.R. § 750.4(a) (1998).
337 See Bernstein I11, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
338 15 C.F.R. § 756.2(c)(1) (1998).
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to be final and not subject to judicial review.339 This restriction
also caused the regulations to fail the last Freedman factor, which
requires a licensor to either issue a license or go to court to seek a
restraint.3 40 The Bernstein III court also found the regulations to be
"lacking... any standards for deciding an application"3 4' because
the EAR requires application review on a "case-by-case basis" and
342appears to impose no limits on agency discretion. In summary,
Judge Patel remained true to her Bernstein H opinion, which
labeled the scheme a "paradigm of standardless discretion. 343
The Karn analysis applied the less stringent standard for
content-neutral conduct regulation and, not surprisingly, reached
the opposite result.34" Both the first and second O'Brien prongs
were satisfied because the plaintiff did not dispute them.345
Although the first prong (regulating export was within the
constitutional power of government), was difficult to debate, it is
somewhat surprising that the government interest was not
disputed. In the face of no rebuttal, the government convinced the
court that "interception of communication made by foreign
intelligence targets is 'essential to the national defense, national
security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States.,'3 46 The plaintiff instead focused on the third prong, which
required that "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the
government's] interest. ,34' The plaintiff argued that his algorithms
"were already widely available in other countries ... or [were] so
weak' that they could be broken by the [National Security
339 See id. at § 756.2(c)(2).
340 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
341 Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
342 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b) (1998).
343 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't. of State (Bernstein II), 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1289 (1996).
Although Judge Patel's strong remarks dealt with ITAR, her EAR decision found similar
problems. See Bernstein I1, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
344 See Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded
per curiam, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
141 See id. at II.
346 Id. (citation omitted).
141 Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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Agency]," but the court considered this to be a second-prong
argument.3 4' Further, the court considered the argument to be a
policy dispute with the President "for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry. 3 49 Thus what began as an O'Brien
analysis came to center on separation of powers concerns.
Requests by the plaintiff to balance First Amendment harms with
any injury to national security were also rebuffed by Judge
Richey.5 The final Karn result left the export restrictions intact,
but the prior restraint arguments by the plaintiff and the analysis
by the court appear insufficient in the face of Bernstein's
exhaustive analyses.
The Junger analysis applied neither the Freedman nor the
O'Brien test. Rather, Judge Gwin began with the proposition that
publishing encryption source code was conduct and went on to
apply conduct-specific rules to reject Junger's prior restraint
.. 352
assertion."' The conduct case, Roulette v. City of Seattle,352 was
pivotal in Judge Gwin's finding that "the prior restraint doctrine is
not implicated simply because an activity may on occasion be
expressive." '353 Based on this finding, the court was able to reject
the facial challenge without even considering the adequacy of the
regulation's procedural safeguards.354
348 Id. (citation omitted) (second alteration in original).
349 Id. at 11-12 (quoting Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman SS Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
350 See id. at 12 (stating again that scrutiny into actual injury of national security is
a political question not subject to review),
351 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d 708, 718-19 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
352 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that although sitting on city sidewalks may
occassionally be expressive, city ordinance prohibiting sitting is not subject to facial
challenge).
113 Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 718. Although this appears to supply a short and simple
answer to the prior restraint conflict between Bernstein III and Karn, the court's
assumption that the publication of source code by Junger or other cryptographers
constitutes conduct is flawed. Claims that source code is rarely expressive. demonstrates
the technological ignorance of the courts. In fact, a critical component of trusted
encryption algorithms is that they have been published and subjected to critical review.
See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
354 See Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 719.
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D. Other Constitutional Avenues
Although this Comment is not intended to provide in-depth
analysis of all constitutional issues relating to encryption export, it
is worth noting a few other constitutional arguments that could be
developed in litigation or commentary. These additional issues
include overbreadth, and Fourth and Fifth Amendment infirmities
of the current encryption export scheme.
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine
Overbreadth as a constitutional doctrine allows a person whose
own speech is protected to challenge an overbroad law on its face
to protect his own speech,355 as well as the speech of others not
before the court.356  The challenge is aimed at a regulation that
"does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of
state control but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities
protected" by the First Amendment." Regarding the encryption
export scheme, Junger argued it "covers encryption software after
it is already available overseas and on the Internet, interferes with
academic freedom, and restricts rights to communicate not just
with foreign persons outside the United States, but with United
States citizens." '358 Further, it may even reach software that
contains no encryption capability whatsoever under provisions
regulating encryption software.5  In addition, Junger's
overbreadth challenge was impacted by the requirement that "a
plaintiff must show that the law will have a significant and
different impact on third parties' free speech interests than it has
311 See Board of Trustees of S.U.N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484 (1989).
356 See Forsyth County v. National Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992).
357 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). Such a threat "must not only be
real, but substantial." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
358 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d
708 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (No. 96 CV 1723) (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.jya.com/
pdj4.htm>.
"I See id. Such products include word processors and communications software
that allow "plug-in" encryption modules. See Telephone Interview with Peter Junger,
Plaintiff (Nov. 2, 1997). Although the products are not shipped with encryption
capability, their interface designed to use encryption "plug-ins" could bring them under
export scrutiny. See id.
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on his own."3'6 Although no court has invalidated an encryption
regulation on this logic, that is likely because the overbreadth
doctrine is "concededly 'strong medicine' employed as a last
resort when a limiting construction cannot be applied to a
statute. 36'
2. The Fourth Amendment: Right to Privacy
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states that "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. 362 This right has become commonly known as the
right to privacy, and such a claim begins with establishing two
elements: (1) that State action is at issue 3 63 and (2) that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the compromised
communication. Once these elements have been met, the inquiry
turns to balancing individual privacy interests against the
government's interest in breaching that privacy.
The typical violation of privacy is a warrantless police search;
31 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp.2d 708, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (citing members of
City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
(1984)). Although Judge Gwin applied this critical element of overbreadth analysis, it
appears he unnecessarily restricted his focus to "other academics" rather than including
anyone wishing to electronically publish encryption source code. Id.
361 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein I), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1438 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, (1973)). In fact, the
"strong medicine" view of overbreadth challenges was directly referenced in Junger.
See Junger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 719.
362 U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Amendment further states that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
363 See Lennon, supra note 18, at 479-80.
31 See id. This involves a recent interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that is
broader than that applied for most of its history. Traditional interpretation placed great
emphasis on words such as "persons, houses, papers, or effects" to the point that
wiretaps had no Fourth Amendment implications. See id. at 481 nn. 97-99. The Warren
Court originated the modern, more adaptive application. See id. at 481 n.99.
365 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)
(noting that searches without "individualized suspicion" are allowed "in limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion").
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however, modem Fourth Amendment interpretation encompasses
a "legislative search" by passage of laws limiting citizen privacy.366
Where such law or rulemaking is done by an agency or
organization, finding State action may require a complex analysis
of funding and control issues. However, regarding encryption
regulations, commentators have noted "the method by which one's
encoding ability would be controlled would be legislative-the
epitome of unequivocal state action.,,16' The next question
involves the reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic
communications, and again, legislative actions dictate the analysis.
In particular, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
198616 provides a clear indication of society's on-line privacy
expectations by forbidding unauthorized interception of email,
inter-computer communications, and cellular phone
369transmissions .
The final and most difficult analysis involves balancing
privacy and governmental interests. Where government searches
are focused on a particular investigative target, Winston v. Lee37 °
represents the typical approach, comparing the "great" state
interest in policing a crime to individual interests in privacy. 7
However, given that encryption restrictions are not predicated
upon a particularized suspicion, a tougher Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association... balancing test is applied. In that
case the Court held that broad, targetless searches are allowable
only "where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered
366 See Lennon, supra note 18, at 480-81.
367 Id. at 480 (citing William B. Harvey, Private Restraint of Expressive Freedom:
A Post-Prune Yard Assessment, 69 B.U. L. REV. 929, 969 (1989)).
368 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1988).
369 See Manufacturas Int'l, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 792 F. Supp
180 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (protecting computer transmissions from electronic
eavesdropping). For a listing of wiretap cases see Lennon, supra note 18, at 483-84
n.l 13. Note however that the mobility of pagers and personal digital assistants may
limit the expectation of privacy of such devices. See Lennon, supra note 18, at 486-87.
370 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
371 See id. (balancing the government and personal interests involved in removing a
bullet from a person's body to aid law enforcement).
372 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion. 3 73  Although particular wiretapping
successes, such as capturing child molesters appear, in hindsight,
to evidence the government's important interest in eavesdropping,
there is little to suggest that handicapping everyone's encryption
abilities is necessary for those successes.37' The resulting
governmental interest appears lacking in comparison to the
citizenry's interest in free and private exchange of ideas. As on-
line communications make up a larger portion of daily discourse,
this privacy interest will only grow. The importance will not lie in
an individual paper or personal effect, but will involve the very
lifeline of societal interconnectedness.
3. The Fifth Amendment: Substantive Due Process for
Fundamental Rights
An intimately related constitutional argument involves the
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that no person shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." '375 From those vanilla words has sprung the controversial
doctrine of substantive due process, which requires strict scrutiny
for laws affecting fundamental rights.376  This approach is
intertwined with Fourth Amendment analysis because privacy is
again the key issue. Although courts have recognized a
fundamental right in various privacy-related topics such as
abortion377 and right-to-die decisions,38 the general right to private
communications has not been established. The broad test for
171 Id. at 624.
174 Commentators have noted that only 183 wiretaps have been affected by
encryption. See Lennon, supra note 18, at 494 (citing statistics presented by FBI
Director Louis Freeh); see Cost of Wiretap Bill Examined at House Subcommittee
Hearing, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 176, at A13, A14 (Sept. 14, 1994).
Given that between 1982 and 1991 alone, over 7,467 wiretaps were conducted,
commentators question the significance of any law enforcement impact. See id.
... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
376 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 813-42, 940-1072 (3d ed.
1996) (describing both the early fundamental right to contract and modem substantive
due process rights such as privacy, personhood and family).
377 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
378 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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establishing such a right requires looking to the "traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people."37 9  The test involves
whether the right in question "cannot be denied without violating
those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions."'380
Historic evidence supports both sides of the encryption debate
because the forefathers have a history of encrypting messages,"'
but they also have a history of intercepting and monitoring private
382communications. To accurately apply fundamental rights
principles, the debate may need to focus on whether unbreakable
.. 383
encryption is the issue. Throughout history the government has
typically been more cryptographically advanced than its citizens
and, thus, tradition may teach that private citizens have a
fundamental right only in breakable encryption. Only in the last
ten years has private computing power enabled individuals to
utilize encryption algorithms which significantly limit government
access. Unfortunately, this technology phenomenon limits the
"traditions" fundamental rights analysis and may force more
esoteric discussions of Bill of Rights "penumbras ''3 4 creating a
right to privacy.
3 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted).
380 Id.
381 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing early use of encryption by
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson).
382 See The Impact on America's Software Industry of Current U.S. Government
Munitions Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade
and Environment of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 5 (1993)
(statement of Stephen T. Walker, President, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.) (noting
that the ability of the U.S. government to obtain information on its adversaries has been
vital to U.S. security for many years).
383 By unbreakable the author means encryption which current governmental
technologies are not able to break in a police-acceptable time period. Some
commentators suggest that the government confuses the concept of making wiretapping
"more difficult" with the notion of making it impossible. See Mike Godwin, To Tap or
Not To Tap, COMM. ACM, Mar. 1993, at 34.
384 See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 at 484 (finding a right to privacy in the "penumbra"
of many privacy-related rights protected in the Constitution).
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4. A Final Constitutional Note: Whose Rights are at Stake
As mentioned above, there are a number of constitutional
approaches to the encryption battle, and this Comment focused on
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment concerns. It is important to
note that these arguments do not all protect the same victim. The
First Amendment issues pertain to software providers and their
freedom of expression in their code. That is, the regulations form
a prior restraint and force encryption code publishers to obtain a
license before they can publish their encryption solutions to the
rest of the world. 85 These victims appear to receive the most
favorable treatment in the courts, possibly because their injury is
easy to see and remedy.
However, the Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments present
an entirely different victim and a couple of levels of indirection
that limit their persuasiveness. These arguments attempt to protect
encryption users-conceivably everyone-in their desire to
communicate privately. This group is rather nebulous and it
may be difficult for courts to pinpoint a common right due to such
a diverse group. Further, the regulations at issue affect these
victims only indirectly. The courts are asked to accept that
removing regulations on one group, publishers, will remedy a
violation experienced by a different group, users. An even greater
leap is necessary because encryption regulations are focused on
export only. The courts are asked to accept that, for economic
385 See generally supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text (describing the
application of the prior restraint doctrine to licensing schemes).
386 Justice Douglas summarized the fear underlying these arguments in stating:
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being
recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most
secret thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the
most confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying
ears .... If a man's privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free? If
his every word is taken down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may
be, who can say he enjoys freedom of speech? If his every association is
known and recorded, if the conversations with his associates are purloined, who
can say he enjoys freedom of association? When such conditions obtain, our
citizens will be afraid to utter any but the safest and most orthodox thoughts;
afraid to associate with any but the most acceptable people. Freedom as the
Constitution envisages it will have vanished.
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353-54 (1966).
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reasons, providers will not invest in creating two versions of their
product, domestic and international.387 Domestic users thus will
receive the lowest common denominator of encryption
technologies."'
V. Encryption Policies Both Home and Abroad
Although the constitutional arguments outlined above
encompass the majority of encryption issues discussed in the
courts, it is also important to understand the policy considerations
of the recent private encryption debate. Further, while U.S. legal
doctrines may be interesting for international entities, true insights
grow from the common encryption policy concerns that all
governments face. This section focuses on outlining these policy
concerns and concludes by surveying the international and
domestic regulatory activities taking place to address these
concerns.
A. The Metes and Bounds of the Encryption Policy Debate
Before discussing each of the major encryption issues, it is
important at the start to recognize a few encryption regulation
alternatives that form the battlefield. Key management, as briefly
discussed in Part 11,389 plays a large role in international and
legislative debates. The question of whether governments should
require key recovery, which is essentially giving individuals or
law enforcement a "spare key" to decrypt private conversations,390
is not an easy one in light of the personal and national security
interests being balanced. The regulatory alternatives in this
balance can be grouped in four categories: (1) regulations
387 See Elizabeth Corcoran, Who Will Hold the Key? Two Bills Reflect the Split
Over Restrictions, at F15 (visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/tech/analysis/encryption/issues.htm>. The author cites industry executive concerns
that export restrictions affect what is sold here because companies find it costly to offer
separate products in different markets. See id. This creates an industry tendency to sell
simpler, exportable products both within the United States and abroad. See id.
388 See Johnson, supra note 75, § 5.3 (noting that "export controls on encryption
software discourage distribution of strong encryption software" in the United States).
389 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
390 See Corcoran, at F15 (referring to two competing bills which differ on whether
law enforcement agencies should have "spare keys" to unlock scrambled information).
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prohibiting use of strong encryption as defined by the government;
(2) regulations allowing use of strong encryption only if
government key recovery exists for law enforcement benefit; (3)
regulations allowing use of strong encryption only if private key
recovery exists for private data recovery benefit; or (4) regulations
allowing use of strong encryption with no key recovery
requirements. 9'
In addition to key recovery alternatives, governments must
decide whether encryption restrictions should focus on domestic
use or international export. While the majority of U.S. encryption
regulation attempts have focused on export controls, the past year
has seen an increased push by law enforcement for limiting
domestic encryption use. 3" This recent domestic focus is having
two effects: (1) resources focused on fighting export regulations
have been shifted to opposing this new and greater threat to
personal liberties, and (2) as regulation hits closer to home,
legislators and their constituencies are taking notice of the "Big
Brother" ramifications and fighting harder against all encryption
regulations. 393 Although the government has consistently insisted
that there are serious national security concerns, several regulation
criticisms have been advanced.
1. The Cornerstone Government Argument: National
Security
As mentioned in the constitutional analysis above, the
underlying government objective in encryption regulations is to
maximize national security. 394 Because such a foreign affairs topic
391 This fourth alternative is essentially a government statement that they trust the
market system to produce the most efficient result. Such a solution would require little
legislation-possibly involving statutes aimed at pre-empting intrusive state law
enforcement encryption restrictions.
392 See Alex Lash, FBI wants domestic crypto keys, (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,12317,00.html>.
13 See Courtney Macavinta, Group to attack Clinton on crypto, (visited Oct. 3,
1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,19388,00.html>.
4 The FBI has argued that widespread availability of strong encryption makes it
difficult if not impossible for government agencies to effectively use wiretaps against
criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists. See Pilkington, supra note 19, at 164-65 n.43 and
accompanying text.
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is traditionally non-justiciable, the government has been forced to
provide more justifications to the public for this stance than to the
courts. In short, law enforcement feels that the spread of
encryption software would "help spies, terrorists and other
'enemies' of America keep communications secret from NSA's
electronic eavesdroppers."'3 95 The FBI has stated that the results of
widespread encryption could include "increase in loss of life,
attributable to an inability to prevent terrorist acts and murders, an
increase in corruption and in the availability of illegal drugs, and a
substantial increase in undetected and unprosecuted violent
crimes."'3 96 These possibilities stem from both an inability to crack
strong encryption, and a difficulty in identifying criminal
activity.' 97 Regulations that encourage law-abiding citizens to use
weak encryption allow law enforcement to look only for those
communications using strong encryption.398 Thus, unregulated
encryption use would create a flood of data streams that all look
alike, and law enforcement would have to resort to off-line means
for identifying criminal communications.
Direct criticisms of the government's argument are: (1) the
majority of law enforcement currently does and will always
require non-decryption methods of investigation and (2) limiting
encryption levels or forcing key recovery is actually more
dangerous for national security than the alternative.3 9 Regarding
395 Evans, supra note 5, at 487 (citations omitted).
396 Pilkington, supra note 19, at 164-65 n.43.
397 See Evans, supra note 5, at 487-88 & n.222 and accompanying text (noting that
it becomes much more difficult for the NSA to find criminal communications as more
and more information is encrypted).
398 This has mainly been discussed by commentators and opponents. See generally
id. It would be difficult for law enforcement to discuss any eavesdropping tactics which
focus on encryption use rather than criminal probable cause.
"I "The U.S. Commerce Department has reported that 'new technologies are the
strongest assurance for maintaining a superior national security posture."' Evans, supra
note 5, at 488-89 (quoting Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliot-Gower, U.S. Export
Controls in Transition: Implications of the New Security Environment, TECH. MARKETS
AND EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE 1990S 105, ]1l (1991)). Technologists have also noted
that security is not served by encryption regulations because they are not feasible. See
Security Hearings, supra note 30, at 23 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (noting that
"people who are bound to use encryption to try to commit crimes are not going to
escrow their keys."); see id. at 91 (statement of Matthew Blaze, principal research
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non-decryption methods, Philip Karn disputed a law enforcement
charge that Aldrich Ames thwarted investigations by using
encryption." In fact, Kam said that Ames was "easily convicted
on the basis of other overwhelming evidence... from
microphones physically planted in his house that picked up many
incriminating telephone conversations. 40 ' Further, such traditional
law enforcement techniques would work even if criminals used
unbreakable encryption for their communications. 42  Regarding
the danger of regulating encryption, commentators have noted that
discouraged technologies will not receive research and
development dollars. 4 3  This leads to national atrophy in that
technology as other, non-regulating countries move ahead.4°4 The
ultimate result of this cycle for encryption is that other countries
and their citizens will be able to communicate using technologies
U.S. law enforcement are unable to break. Even worse, the United
States and its citizens will communicate with technologies inferior
to those of the criminals of the world, leaving the United States
vulnerable to commercial and military attacks.40 ' This reasoning is
the basis for a litany of encryption regulation criticisms on behalf
of consumers.
scientist, AT&T Research) (warning that comprehensive key escrow entails great
complexity with inevitable failures); see Abelson et al., supra note 33 (noting that the
technology infrastructure required for today's key recovery solutions is enormously
complex and is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field).
"0 See Philip R. Karn, Jr., Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property Additional Comments of Philip R. Karn, Jr., March 20,
1997 (visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://people.qualcomm.com/karn/export/followup.html>
(questioning claims by the government that Aldrich Ames was able to thwart law
enforcement efforts by using encryption methods).
401 Id.
402 See id.
403 See Johnson, supra note 75, § 3.9 (noting that "when a technology is
discouraged by over-regulation, taxation or other means, that technology becomes less
profitable in the country where it is discouraged.").
404 See id.
405 See Sen. Patrick Leahy, chief sponsor of The Encrypted Communications
Privacy Act, S.376, Encryption: The Best On-line Crime Prevention Tool, passim (July
28, 1997) (visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/s970728.html> (noting
that "[t]he best defense for computer break-ins-both accidental and intentional-is a
good offense").
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2. Consumer Protection and Privacy
Although mechanically the same, arguments about weakening
consumer encryption stand on two different grounds:
(1) consumers are best protected from criminals by strong
encryption and (2) consumers are best protected from the
government by strong encryption.40 ' The focus on criminal activity
relies on market discussions of how best to expand the Internet and
world economies. The focus on government intrusion relies on
human rights discussions of whether citizens should be allowed to
communicate privately.4 °7
As technology expands and accelerates channels of
communication, consumer vulnerability also increases.4 8
Encryption provides many the opportunity to gain the benefits of
powerful information technologies while minimizing vulnerability.
As noted by cryptography expert Michael Johnson, "[n]o law can
keep spies and criminals from listening to [our
communications],.. . but encryption can make ... [such
communications] unintelligible to criminals and other
unauthorized listeners.,, 409  Key recovery plans in particular have
been cited as increasing vulnerability.4 ° Mandatory key recovery
infrastructures, which place thousands of keys in one location ,4, I
will "create extremely valuable targets, more likely to be worth the
406 Although strong encryption is often referred to as encryption with keys longer
than 56 bits, the use of the term in this section also assumes no key recovery is involved
that might jeopardize security.
407 See also supra notes 375-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutional arguments for a right to privacy). This short discussion focuses on the
policy arguments being made by individuals, rather than legal doctrines. Understanding
the policy arguments is essential to analyzing international encryption solutions since
national privacy laws differ dramatically.
408 See Abelson et al., supra note 33, § 1.1 (noting that "[t]he basic communication
infrastructure of our society is becoming less secure, even as we use it for increasingly
vital purposes").
409 Johnson, supra note 75, § 3.7.
410 See Abelson et al., supra note 33, § 3.1.3.
411 Such key recovery agents play a vital role in all government key recovery
solutions. These agents manage thousands of keys and provide access for law
enforcement agencies or individuals-or lose their key. See Abelson et al., supra note
33, § 3.1.3.
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cost and risk of attack. ' '4 2  As increasingly private data such as
banking and medical records travel online, the protection
limitations mandated by encryption regulation cause greater
concern for consumers.
In addition to the issue of vulnerability to criminal intrusion,
weak or key recovery encryption leaves citizens at the mercy of
their government's commitment to privacy. While most privacy
arguments turn immediately to the U.S. Constitution and its Fourth
Amendment, it is important to remember that not all countries
recognize that protection. Phil Zimmerman has learned of this
disparity first-hand through communications such as one from
Latvia stating: "If dictatorship takes over Russia your PGP is
widespread from Baltic to Far East now and will help democratic
people if necessary. Thanks." 3  As interactions become more
global it won't matter whether one's home country values privacy.
Communications which bounce across the Internet will
undoubtedly pass through countries with a different threshold of
privacy respect. l4 In fact, commentators have suggested that
"[n]ational law enforcement agencies... might abuse their key
recovery authority to the advantage of their own country's
,,415
corporations.
3. Economic Impacts
The final criticism of encryption export controls is the one that
garners the most attention in social and legislative circles, namely
412 Id.
411 William M. Bulkeley, Cipher Probe: Popularity Overseas of Encryption Code
Has the U.S. Worried, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1994, at Al; see also Security Hearings,
supra note 30 (statement of Phillip Zimmerman, Chairman and Chief Technology
Officer, Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.) (recalling thankful email from Burmese parents that
don't understand our "fascination with such a narrow, rare, crime as [child
pornography] ... because over there.., they're concerned about children there too, not
so much for child pornography, but because in that part of the world children are
tortured in front of their parents, to extract confessions").
414 See id. at 74 (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center for
Democracy and Technology) (noting that "[tlhe Fourth Amendment, which is a
wonderful embodiment of our Constitution, does not apply to the world").
415 Abelson et al., supra note 33, § 3.1.2.
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that encryption controls hurt domestic companies. The criticism
is not hollow commercial banter; rather, a joint study by the NSA
and the Commerce Department on the effect of export controls
concluded that "[e]ncryption controls are harming United States
firms."4 7 The financial harm to the American computer industry is
estimated to reach sixty billion dollars annually by the year
2000.48 The losses affect not only email encryption providers
such as PGP, but also mass-market software firms such as
Microsoft and IBM.49 Baltimore Technologies, a Belgium-based
security software company, is winning customers abroad and has
found that their banking customers "didn't even consider any U.S.
cryptography vendor because [they] needed full 128-bit
encryption., 420 A true measure of the impact is likely larger than
reported because companies fear that expressing dissatisfaction
could hinder their future export licensing requests. 42' Nevertheless,
this dampening effect may be disappearing as more firms join the
push for encryption export reform. Indeed, as firms and citizens
across the world recognize the many issues involved, national
legislative forums serve as precursors to an impending
international resolution.422
416 See Pilkington, supra note 19, at 163-64 (noting that there is widespread
agreement that "export controls on encryption hamper United States competitiveness
and cause United States firms to lose worldwide market share for mass marketed
software, an industry which United States firms previously dominated") (citations
omitted).
417 Id. at 164.
48 See Security Hearings, supra note 30, at 126 (statement of Jerry Berman,
Executive Director, Center for Democracy and Technology, regarding a survey of 13
large American technology firm CEOs).
419 See Evans, supra note 5, at 481 n.150 (noting Wordperfect Corporation's claims
that it would have used a stronger encryption algorithm if export regulations permitted).
420 Niall McKay, 128-bit Encryption Offered Abroad, INFOWORLD, October 20,
1997, at 86.
421 See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
422 In fact, industry pressure appears to have already scored a victory at the White
House. See Courtney Macavinta, White House eases crypto limits (visited Sept. 18,
1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/O,4,26427,00.html>. Following months of
public and private debate, the White House relaxed its encryption policy by allowing
non-licensed export of strong encryption products for use in international company
intranets. See id. Free expression advocates fear, however, that the White House
strategy of appeasing industry advocates "could divide the industry from the broader
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B. How the World Has Responded So Far
As witnessed by the criticisms discussed above, encryption
impacts cannot be resolved on a national scale. Due to the global
nature of the world economy and the maturing Information
Superhighway, national solutions also beget advantages or
disadvantages for foreign people and firms. Unfortunately, global
solutions have so far proved to be inadequate and no model has
emerged which is embraced by all countries. This section
discusses attempts at global agreement and provides a detailed
summary of how countries have handled issues such as key
recovery, and export and domestic regulations.
1. Initial International Cooperation
Initial attempts at a global solution involved the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was
an international organization devoted to synchronizing member
country export restrictions on "strategic products and technical
data., 423 In 1991 COCOM decided to allow export of mass-market
and public domain cryptographic software, and most members
followed its regulations, although the United States maintained
separate regulations. A year after COCOM dissolved in 1994, a
follow-up organization was formed under the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.42' That agreement controlled
privacy groups in the debate going on in Congress." Id. (noting further that
"concessions ... to the commercial sector [do] nothing to enhance . . . access to strong
encryption for individuals.").
423 Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey, June 1998 (last modified June 11, 1998)
<http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/cls2.htm> [hereinafter Koops Survey]. The 17
members included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. Further cooperating members included
Austria, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. See id. The committee's main goal was to
"prevent cryptography from being exported to 'dangerous' countries ... such as Libya,
Iraq, Iran and North Korea." Id.
424 See id.
425 See id. That agreement included 33 international signees: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian
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the export of weapons and of dual-use goods426 such as
cryptography, and its provisions were quite similar to COCOM's
provisions. 427 The Wassenaar Agreement initially excepted public-
domain software, but encryption was later excluded from that
428exception.. Moreover, the regulations do not appear to cover
export via the Internet.
429
A more recent international encryption effort involved the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and its Recommendation of the Council Concerning
Guidelines for Cryptography Policy.430 The guidelines are not
binding on member states, but they do provide recommendations
for member governments to consider as they decide national
policies. 431' The guidelines describe the many issues involved with
encryption and the benefits of market-driven development of
cryptographic methods.432 Key escrow, a contentious issue among
OECD members, was neither endorsed nor prohibited in the
report.433 In fact, the guidelines allow broad interpretation for
countries to choose privacy-centered or law enforcement-centered
policies as they desire.434 This broad reading was necessary given
a rigid split between key escrow435 advocates such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, and key escrow
Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See id.
426 A dual-use good is one "that can be used both for a military and for a civil
purpose." Id.
427 See id.
421 See id.
429 See id.
430 See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for Crytopraphic
Policy (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/cryptol.htm>
(describing the OECD guidelines released March 27, 1997).
431 See Koops Survey, supra note 423.
432 See Guidelines for Cryptography Policy (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
<http://www.oced.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/crypto2.htm>.
411 See id.
434 See id.
435 The "key escrow" term was not generally accepted by the members. Some
countries preferred the term "trusted third party" (TTP) to "key escrow." See Stewart A.
Baker, Summary Report on the OECD Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts on Cryptography
<http://steptoe.com/276908.htm> (on file with author).
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opponents such as Japan, Australia, and the Scandinavian
countries.436 Even countries supporting key escrow did not support
the U.S. proposal that suggested all escrow agents be located in the
United States. 37 Countries opposing key escrow prefer relying on
warrants requiring defendants to decrypt their data.438 Denmark's
solution was to "shift the burden of proof to the defendant if he
does not provide certain kinds of evidence that is within his
control. 439  Although OECD discussions and guidelines provide
insight into the two camps of international opinion, they do not
provide a clear standard for all members to follow.
2. A Global Shift Away from the Regulation
and Key Escrow
Although COCOM and OECD solutions encouraged the
international community to define the issues in the encryption
dispute, those solutions did not resolve core policy differences
between the members. For example, few nations have identical
regulations regarding encryption key escrow, export use, and
domestic use. The following table presents a multi-government
checklist of these issues as a distillation of surveys performed by
Bert-Jaap Koops and the Global Internet Liberty Campaign:40
436 See id.
417 See id. (noting that Canada was concerned with U.S. control and that "[t]he UK,.
which was among the more supportive governments toward U.S. policy, nonetheless
expressed the view that using U.S. export control laws to require that keys be escrowed
in the U.S. would be a problem for the UK government").
438 Australia supported this approach but had not solved the self-incrimination
aspects of such a policy. See id.
439 Id.
440 See Koops Survey, supra note 423 (discussing developments restricting and
favoring cryptography in each country); Global Internet Library Campaign,
Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy (visited Sept.
11, 1998) <http://www.gilc.org/crypto/crypto-results.html> [hereinafter GILC Survey]
(analyzing encryption activities of each country and declaring a green, yellow, or red
light for their position).
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Region Supports Export Domestic
Escrow? Regulations? Regulations?
Anguilla No"' No No
Argentina No 442  No No
Armenia No No 43  No
Australia No License No
Austria No License Corporate
use
Bangladesh 444 No
Belgium No License No
Belize No No
Brazil No No No
Bulgaria Yes Yes
Byelorussia License
Campione License445  No
d'Italia
Canada Yes License 446  No
China Yes Yes
Croatia No No
Czech No No No
Republic
44' Not only does Anguilla not support U.S. initiatives such as key escrow, but it
has also launched a civil disobedience campaign which allows one to send an encryption
program to Anguilla in opposition to U.S. regulations. See GILC Survey, supra note
440.
442 Although the survey found no regulation, restrictions are expected within the
next year. See Koops Survey, supra note 423.
4" Although Armenia currently has no policy against the use of encryption, the
government recently established a Department of Information and Publications, which is
planning to initiate cryptography legislation. See GILC Survey, supra note 440.
444 Blank entries indicate that either the government has made no statement
regarding the issue or the current legal state is unclear.
445 This small Italian enclave, which is surrounded by Switzerland, generally
adheres to Swiss laws. There is little or no restriction for encryption products in
Switzerland. See GILC Survey, supra note 440.
446 All types of cryptography can be transported between Canada and the United
States. See Koops Survey, supra note 423.
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Denmark No License No
Estonia License
Falkland No No
Islands
Finland No License No
France Yes License447  Yes
Germany Yes License No
Greece No
Hong Kong License" 8
Hungary License No
Iceland No
India License
Indonesia Yes
Ireland No No No
Israel Yes License
449
Italy Yes License Yes45
Japan No License45' No
Kazakhstan License License
Latvia No License No
Lithuania No No
Malaysia No No
Mexico No
Mount No452  No No
Athos
Nauru No No No
447 Authentication or integrity-only cryptography may be exported if a declaration
dossier is deposited. See id.
448 Licenses are required except for access-control equipment and authentication
cryptography that cannot be used for encrypting files or text. See id.
449 Licenses are virtually always granted. See id.
450 A law demands accessibility of encrypted records for the treasury. See id.
41 Export approvals are required for cryptography orders larger than 50,000 yen.
See id.
452 This religious, self-governed part of the Greek state warned Athens that any
attempt to restrict encryption would be opposed by all its resident monks "as
conscientious objectors." GILC Survey, supra note 440.
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The Yes License 453  No
Netherlands
New No License No
Zealand
Norway License No
Pakistan Yes
Philippines No No
Poland License No
Portugal No
Romania Yes
Russia Yes License
Saudi No Yes454
Arabia
Singapore No No455
South No Yes
Africa
South Korea Yes No
Spain Yes No
Swaziland No No
Sweden No License No
Switzerland License 456  Yes
Taiwan Yes Yes No
Turkey License No
U.K. Yes 457  License 45 s  No
U.S. Yes License No459
453 Licenses are required only for items capable of file encryption. See Koops
Survey, supra note 423.
454 It is reported that Saudi Arabian regulations prohibiting encryption use are
widely ignored. See id.
455 However, subscriber agreements with SingTel require approval from the
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore. See id.
456 Licenses are required for export to non-OECD countries. See id.
457 Only confidentiality keys must be handed over, not signature keys. No
distinction is made for dual-use keys. See id.
458 Exports by intangible means, such as over the Internet, are not covered by the
regulations. See id.
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In addition to recognizing the variety of regulations being used
by countries today, the recent battle over key escrow that is
brewing between the United States and European nations is worth
• 460
noting. In particular, the success of the Labour party in the
United Kingdom brought a new perspective to the U.K.'s
regulatory policy. The United Kingdom, who had previously
voiced strong support for key escrow, recently expressed a
position that they "do not accept the 'clipper chip' argument
developed in the United States for the authorities to be able to
swoop down on any encrypted message at will and unscramble
it."'461 Instead, they support the Danish approach of enabling
"decryption to be demanded under judicial warrant (in the same
way that a warrant is required in order to search someone's
home)., 462 Finally, in outlining this new philosophy for the United
Kingdom, the Labour party states that "[a]ttempts to control the
use of encryption technology are wrong in principle, unworkable
in practice, and damaging to the long-term economic value of the
information networks. 463
In addition to the Labour party opposition, U.S. policymakers
459 Although export has been the regulatory focus up until now, Congressional and
F.B.I. rumblings are moving the fight into the domestic arena. In particular, proposals
from the House Intelligence Committee would "ban encryption inside the United States
unless it contains features to provide law enforcement 'immediate access' to the plain
text of encrypted information." Center for Democracy and Technology, H.R. 695-The
"Safe" Bill: Latest News (last modified Apr. 22, 1998) <http://www.cdt.org/crypto/
legis_105/SAFE/latest.html> [hereinafter CDT Summary]. These proposals come as
amendments to a pro-encryption bill being debated in House committees. See infra
notes 469-83 and accompanying text.
46 Note that Japan already disagreed with the U.S. escrow policy. See Stewart A.
Baker, Decoding OECD Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, 31 INT'L LAW. 729, 734-
49 (1997). If the Europeans remain opposed to U.S. regulation proposals, key allies to
the United States become China and the Russian republics-two regions which were
historically viewed as oppressive to their citizens. See id.
461 THE LABOUR PARTY, The Labour Party-Information Superhighway (visited
Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.labour.org.uk/views/info-highway/content.html> (outlining
the British Labour Party's position on a variety of Internet issues including encryption).
462 Id. This is consistent with their claim that it is unnecessary to "criminalise a
large section of the network-using public to control the activities of a very small
minority of law-breakers." Id.
463 Id.
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have received pressure from the European Commission (EC). In a
report drafted by the European Internet Forum, the EC warned that
"[r]estricting the use of encryption could well prevent law-abiding
companies and citizens from protecting themselves against
criminal attacks .... It would not, however, totally prevent
criminals from using these technologies. 4 6 This sentiment was
echoed in January 1998 when Europeans criticized the United
States "for its largely go-it-alone approach., 465 They emphasized
that "the European Union's approach is for less regulation, more
industry self-regulation, and more trust in market forces. 466
Deborah Hurley, a Harvard professor following encryption issues,
remarked that "U.S. government representatives say that the rest of
the world is going to do key escrow.., in the next five
minutes., 46' Nevertheless, she noted that "only the United States
and France are now pursuing such systems. 46 8 The next year
appears to be pivotal for the United States to decide if it will
continue its key escrow plans despite waning support. Such a
proposition appears unlikely because U.S. software producers
forced to include back doors for the U.S. government will be
crippled by commercial forces since foreign governments are
allowing their companies to provide more secure products.
VI. Conclusion
A. Current Legislative Options
The House and Senate of the 105th Congress have each
introduced their own bills to "solve" the problems of current
encryption export regulations. Representative Robert Goodlatte's
original Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act 69
46 Dan Goodin, EC report counterpoint to Clinton crypto, (visited Sept. 11, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,15038,00.html>.
465 Tim Clark, Europeans slam U.S. crypto policy, (visited Sept. 11, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,18079,00.html>.
466 Id.
467 Id. (suggesting that the United States and other key escrow advocates are
"shoveling sand against the tide").
468 Id.
469 H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997).
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loosens the export restrictions and offers key recovery as a
voluntary option for companies but does not mandate it.470 The bill
claims that "the way to help law enforcement in this field is to
encourage people to use strong encryption. ' ' 7 Nevertheless, since
the bill was first introduced, it has been amended in five different
committees, and the final bill presented to the House floor could
look entirely different. Senator John McCain sponsored one
Senate counterpart in the form of the Secure Public Networks
Act,73 which has not yet reached the Senate floor. His approach
gives government a more central role and encourages the use of
accepted encryption solutions. The bill would require the use of
key recovery systems when dealing with the government, and it
also makes the use of encryption in criminal activity a separatelypunishble 474
punishable offense. This approach has already received
complaints that key recovery centers would only be used by law-
abiding citizens while criminals would use overseas encryption
solutions. 475 Another Senate solution, the Encryption Protects the
Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in Cyberspace (E-
PRIVACY) Act,476 sponsored by Senator John Ashcroft,'477 chair of
the Senate Judiciary's Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights Subcommittee, is an attempt at compromise between the
Goodlatte and McCain bills.478 At first glance, it appears to follow
470 See Corcoran, supra note 387 (summarizing the two competing encryption bills
heading into the 105th Congress).
471 Id. Representative Goodlatte stated that "[i]f an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure, then an ounce of encryption is worth a pound of subpoenas." Id.
472 Some amendments added mandatory key escrow, and House Rules Committee
Chairman Gerald Solomon has stated that he will not bring SAFE up for consideration
unless it contains such a provision. See CDT Summary, supra note 459.
411 S. 909, 105th Congress (1998).
414 See Corcoran, supra note 387 (noting industry's frustration with the bill,
because key recovery systems are impractical).
471 See id.
476 S. 2067, 105th Cong. (1998).
177 John Ashcroft is chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Constitution,
Federalism, and Property Rights Subcommittee.
471 See id. Shortly after introducing this bill, Senator Ashcroft held hearings before
the Senate Judiciary's Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights Subcommittee
which he chairs. See Privacy in a Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access,
1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property of
1998]
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Goodlatte's approach by emphasizing the need for only voluntary
and market driven controls on the use and sale of encryption.
Unlike Senator McCain, Senator Ashcroft does not use
government contracts as bait for producers to include key480
recovery. Nevertheless, like Senator McCain's bill, the E-
PRIVACY Act does grant exclusive licensing authority to the
Secretary of Commerce with a process requiring pre-export
technical review.48 ' The E-PRIVACY Act has not reached the
482Senate floor but has garnered ten co-sponsors. Progress has been
slow on all of the bills before the 105th Congress, as Presidential
impeachment issues have taken priority.
483
B. Making an Informed Decision
This Comment has focused on the number of issues that make
encryption export a contentious subject. There are no easy
answers for balancing freedom of expression, rights to privacy,
commercial interests, national safety, and international diplomacy.
A key step to finding the answers is recognition of the important
decisions that have been made along the way. In particular, a
federal court has stated clearly that software is an expression
protected by the First Amendment. Like the motion one detects in
one's peripheral vision, the importance of this holding must not
get lost in the focus on encryption. Both the House and Senate
should begin hearings to understand the ramifications of protecting
software as speech. As more communication in our society flows
through computers, it is very possible that Bernstein's result will
define expression into the twenty-first century.
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998).
479 See S. 2067 § 101(c)(l).
480 Cf S. 909 § 207.
481 See S. 2067 § 302. The E-PRIVACY Act would minimize technical review for
"generally available" technology without eliminating it. See id. Instead of product-by-
product licensing review, the Act requires a one-time 15-day technical review after
which export is allowed even without a license. See id.
482 See S. 2067.
483 See Corey Grice, Tech issues in Lewinsky balance (visited Sept. 18, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,26425,00.html> (noting that the Presidential
scandal not only affects the economy, but also "detract[s] from the work at hand on
Washington's high-tech docket.").
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Next, given the need for international consistency in
encryption regulations, both the House and the Senate should
closely examine how other countries approach encryption
regulation. Any law made here that limits encryption may only
sacrifice U.S. citizens' security and its information economy's
future. Thus, of the current House and Senate bills, only the
original SAFE Act should be pursued while such foreign
investigations take place. As its provisions are more lenient than
the global consensus, passage of that bill would jeopardize neither
privacy nor companies.
Finally, Congress and the White House should consider the
constitutional reasoning set forth above, specifically that of the
Bernstein series of decisions, and strike existing encryption export
regulations. They have been labeled an unconstitutional prior
restraint both by the courts and by the State Department. The
federal courts supplied a remedy only to Bernstein 48 but all
encryption providers should benefit from the same constitutional
protections. Concerns for national security do not meet the
threshold necessary for the Freedman factors,485 and policy debates
have suggested that security may be better served by wide-spread
strong encryption.
The steps listed above may seem to suggest that the progress
made by House and Senate committees should be jettisoned. To
the contrary, the United States must learn from congressional,
judicial, and international debates and stop pursuing a government
stance for its own sake. If this can succeed, it will promote
President Clinton's concern for "national security" while
preserving the foundational belief in Justice Brandeis's beloved
"free speech."
DANIEL R. RUA
484 See supra notes 143-202 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
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